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“The war for global leadership in artificial intelligence and machine learning is 
well underway, and the US is poised to lose perhaps the most important 
technology war in its history.”1 
“If you think this has a happy ending, you haven’t been paying attention.” 
Ramsay Bolton to Theon Greyjoy – GOT season 3, episode 62 
I. INTRODUCTION
The progress of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which was created in the
1950s, has ebbed and flowed over the years as ancillary technological 
advances enabling its furtherance have appeared and then stalled.3  Although 
basic AI mechanisms are embedded in modern society in such a way that 
we are no longer surprised by accurate movie and song recommendations 
or when our car beeps to let us know we have drifted into another lane, 
the greatest advances are yet to come.4  The recent AI Spring stems from
the availability of massive amounts of data from the internet, sensors, and 
 1. Steve Andriole, Artificial Intelligence, China and the U.S. - How the U.S. Is Losing
the Technology War, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
steveandriole/2018/11/09/artificial-intelligence-china-and-the-us-how-the-us-is-losing-the-
technology-war/#2a567e616195 [https://perma.cc/H6PE-YT8U].
2. Game of Thrones: The Climb (HBO television broadcast May 5, 2013). 
3. See Tanya Lewis, A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence, LIVE SCI. (Dec. 4,
2014), https://www.livescience.com/49007-history-of-artificial-intelligence.html [perma.cc/ 
VC4S-4BWG].
4. Aaron Smith & Janna Anderson, Predictions for the State of AI and Robotics in
2025, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/06/
predictions-for-the-state-of-ai-and-robotics-in-2025/ [perma.cc/A8KU-HV4K].
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mobile phone usage; increased storage and processing capabilities due to 
advances in chips and cloud storage; and increased transmission and processing
speeds.5  However, the future of AI rests on 5G and edge computing.6 
AI innovation, especially the Internet of Things (IoT), requires a universal
telecommunication infrastructure with massive processing speed and 
reduced latency that the previous iterations are incapable of providing.7 
The importance of 5G to this “technological paradigm shift” cannot be 
overstated.8  The development of this infrastructure appears to be at risk 
as the United States and China refuse to acknowledge their interdependence 
and attempt to push forward without the other.9  The largest producer of
5. See infra Section II.B.
 6. Sarah Yost, Brave New World: Everything Gets Smarter when 5G and AI 
Combine, ELEC. DESIGN (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.electronicdesign.com/industrial-
automation/brave-new-world-everything-gets-smarter-when-5g-and-ai-combine [perma.cc/
7EMB-YK7P] (“5G provides the infrastructure and massive amounts of data that AI needs 
to be successful.”); Maria Hernandez, What 5G Means for the Internet of Things, UBIDOTS 
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://ubidots.com/blog/what-5g-means-for-the-internet-of-things/ [perma.cc/
FG4A-XW93].  A “5G platform will impact many industries including automotive, 
entertainment, agriculture, manufacturing and IT” as it is applied to new applications and 
improves many existing IoT applications.  Jenny Hallmark, The Future of Internet 
of Things, SMB NATION (2016), https://www.smbnation.com/analysis/2563-the-future-of-
internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/9XFC-WF2B]. Machina Research forecasts “IoT will
account for one quarter of the global 41 million 5G connections in 2024.”  Machina 
Research Predicts 10 Million 5G Internet of Things Connections in 2024, GARTNER (Feb.
18, 2016), https://machinaresearch.com/news/machina-research-predicts-10-million-5g-
internet-of-things-connections-in-2024/ [https://perma.cc/6L3K-SVVB].
7. Chen Lifang, Get, Set for Faster Downloads! 5G Will be 100 times Faster than 
4G, FIN. EXPRESS (Nov. 19, 2018, 7:41 AM), https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/
get-set-for-faster-downloads-5g-will-be-100-times-faster-than-4g/1385793/ [perma.cc/97KL- 
U376] (noting that 5G will be up to 100 times faster than 4G with dramatically reduced
latency). Latency is the time it takes for data to be sent from a device to where it is 
processed and back.  Dave Schafer, Bandwidth vs. Latency: What Is the Difference?, 
HIGHSPEEDINTERNET.COM (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.highspeedinternet.com/resources/
bandwidth-vs-latency-what-is-the-difference [https://perma.cc/Y77J-JLN6]. 
8. Marc Emmer, This Technology Is About to Change the World—But No One Is 
Talking About It, INC. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.inc.com/marc-emmer/this-technology-is-
about-to-change-world-but-no-one-is-talking-about-it.html [perma.cc/87W4-3KF5] (explaining 
how 5G will enable holographic projection, health-care enabled devices, smart homes, smart
cities, smart factories, and autonomous vehicles to name a few).
9. See Eric Auchard & Stephen Nellis, What Is 5G and Who Are the Major Players?, 










   
 
  






    
 
  
   
 
 












5G networking equipment, Huawei, is based in China,10 and the second-
largest producer of chips, Intel, is located in the United States.11  The trade 
war has all but stopped the flow of goods between the two nations.  
Although it appears that the United States is feeling the brunt of the pain 
of this trade war, it will have a global impact,12 not just on the economy
and democracy, but on the future of AI itself. 
The U.S. government has taken a hands-off approach to AI and 5G,
relying on private industry to move these fields forward.13  The emergence 
of China as home to the top 5G networking equipment supplier14 and a
growing leader in technology15 appears to have spurred the recent bout of 
tariffs and other protectionist activities by the United States.16  The previous 
four decades of economic cooperation between China and the United 
States was dealt a blow when President Trump instituted the first set of 
10.   Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, China’s Tech Giant Huawei Spans Much of the 
Globe Despite U.S. Efforts to Ban It, NPR (Oct. 24, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2019/10/24/759902041/chinas-tech-giant-huawei-spans-much-of-the-globe-despite-u-s-
efforts-to-ban-it [perma.cc/V3Y2-L8M4]. 
11.   Justin Walton, The World’s Top 10 Semiconductor Companies, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012216/worlds-top-10-semi
conductor-companies-tsmintc.asp [perma.cc/29CN-CNDL]. In fact, six of the top ten largest 
microprocessor manufacturers are based in the United States.  Id. 
12. See, e.g., Debby Wu & Ian King, U.S.-China Fight Over Chip Kingpin Rattles
Tech Industry, BLOOMBERG: QUINT (May 18, 2020, 6:36 AM), https://www.bloom
bergquint.com/technology/global-chipmaking-kingpin-gets-dragged-into-u-s-china-trade-war
[https://perma.cc/EAN8-ZHPU] (exploring the impact of the fight between China’s Huawei
Technologies, Co. and the U.S. government over one of the world’s largest chip manufacturers, 
the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.). 
13. See Kai Ryssdal & Bridget Bodnar, An Artificial Intelligence Battle Is Coming 
Between the U.S. and China, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/
2019/03/06/artificial-intelligence-battle-us-china/ [perma.cc/AN5D-BZGP].  According to Amy
Webb, author of The Big Nine: How the Tech Titans and Their Thinking Machines Could
Warp Humanity, “[w]e’ve had no national strategy on artificial intelligence or on any other 
number of important technologies and areas of science.”  Id.
 14. See Marcus Lu, Visualized: Where 5G Will Change the World, VISUAL CAPITALIST 
(Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualized-where-5g-will-change-the-world/
[https://perma.cc/LT5T-VCHM].
15. Rob Waugh, How China Is Leading the World in Tech Innovation (and What 
the West Can Learn from It), TELEGRAPH (Nov. 16, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.telegraph.
co.uk/connect/better-business/business-solutions/china-technology-innovation/ [perma.cc/
4BST-2H5J] (noting that, despite reports to the contrary, China is succeeding as a leader 
in technology, especially mobile payments, fin tech, social media and AI). But see Alison 
DeNisco Rayome, How China Tried and Failed to Win the AI Race: The Inside Story, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 5, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-
china-tried-and-failed-to-win-the-ai-race-the-inside-story/ [perma.cc/2LDE-E2TY] (“Despite
the ambitious plan and the hyped headlines, China is not as far along in its AI ventures as
its state media would lead you to believe, said [Georg] Stieler,” “managing director of
Stieler Enterprise Management Consulting China.”).
16. See infra Part III. 
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tariffs on Chinese goods in July 2018.17  Ignoring the benefits that trade 
with China has provided to the United States,18 the administration has upended
international protocol and order.19  Despite assurances to the contrary, the
United States will encounter difficulty in creating the infrastructure 
necessary for widespread 5G adoption because of its refusal to use 5G 
equipment from China.20  In fact, because companies in the United States
have sold off many of their hardware divisions to foreign entities, all of 
the top four 5G network equipment companies are located outside of the 
United States.21 
This paper explores the interrelationship between 5G and AI and why 
the U.S. government’s reliance on private industry and the trade war will 
result in an Innovation Winter.  Part II briefly explains what AI is and
what events led to the recent AI Spring.  Part III explores globalization
and the interconnectedness of China and the United States with respect 
to 5G technology and AI.  Part IV discusses the trade war and how the United 
States has shifted its policy from globalization to protectionism and
rejectionism, as well as the resulting harms.  It additionally provides
and refutes the rationales given by the United States for the trade war.  Part
V demonstrates how the trade war will lead to an Innovation Winter and
why coordinated development and international standards are needed for 
the future benefit of the world.  There is a very real risk that should the
United States and China continue with this decoupling, the result could
be a bifurcated internet with highly divergent standards, and technology with
non-interchangeable components, forcing the rest of the world to pick a
side. 
17. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Issues Tariffs on 
Chinese Products in Response to Unfair Trade Practices (June 15, 2018), https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-
products [perma.cc/H98M-U2QS]. 
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Benefits of Trade with China (May 
24, 2007), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp423.aspx [perma.cc/ 
28C8-JBGQ].
19. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Rules-based Trade Made the World Rich. Trump’s Policies 
May Make It Poorer, CONVERSATION (June 10, 2018, 9:28 AM), https://theconversation.com/
rules-based-trade-made-the-world-rich-trumps-policies-may-make-it-poorer-97896 
[perma.cc/V4GK-NBJS].
20. Brian Fung, How China’s Huawei Took the Lead Over U.S. Companies in 5G
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II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Artificial Intelligence? 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a transformative technology that holds promise for
tremendous societal and economic benefit.  AI has the potential to revolutionize 
how we live, work, learn, discover, and communicate.  AI research can further
our national priorities, including increased economic prosperity, improved educational
opportunities and quality of life, and enhanced national and homeland security.22 
In its most basic form, AI is the use of a machine to perform tasks that
can be performed by humans.23  AI is a tool that can automate activities,
extract knowledge from data, and make predictions.24  It is used in movie 
recommendations on Netflix, creating directions on map applications, and 
even to summon a ride home using a smart phone app.25 The potential 
benefits of AI are enormous despite the legitimate risks noted by scholars.26 
22. NETWORKING & INFO. TECH. RESEARCH & DEV. SUBCOMM., NAT’L SCI. & TECH.
COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC 
PLAN (2016) [hereinafter NSTC REPORT ON AI], https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/national_ai
_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7JM-33K4].
 23. Lauri Donahue, A Primer on Using Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Profession, 
HARV. J. L. & TECH.: JOLT DIG. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-
primer-on-using-artificial-intelligence-in-the-legal-profession [perma.cc/KZY9-VUJ6]
(“‘Artificial Intelligence’ is the term used to describe how computers can perform tasks 
normally viewed as requiring human intelligence, such as recognizing speech and objects, 
making decisions based on data, and translating languages.”). 
24. See Huimin Lu et al., Brain Intelligence: Go Beyond Artificial Intelligence, 23 
MOBILE NETWORKS & APPLICATIONS 368, 368–75 (2018).  The term AI is an umbrella for 
many different technologies, including predictive analytics, data mining, machine learning, artificial 
intelligence, neural nets, and deep learning.  See id. 
 25. See Jacques Bughin, et al., Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier? 20,
31, 45 (McKinsey Glob. Inst., Discussion Paper, June 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/
media/mckinsey/industries/advanced%20electronics/our%20insights/how%20artificial%
20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/mgi-artificial-
intelligence-discussion-paper.ashx [https://perma.cc/A9Q4-YPF6].  These are all examples of
what is known as “weak AI” or “narrow AI”—a program designed to perform a task that 
a human can do.  Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1305, 1309 & n.20, 1322 (2019). “General AI” or “Strong AI” as represented 
in robot movies does not yet exist.  Id. at 1309.  “Today’s AI systems cannot, nor are they 
necessarily designed to, match higher-order human abilities, such as abstract reasoning, 
concept comprehension, flexible understanding, general problem-solving skills, and the 
broad spectrum of other functions that are associated with human intelligence.”  Id. (citing 
Jack Krupansky, Untangling the Definitions of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Intelligence, 
and Machine Learning, MEDIUM (June 13, 2017), https://medium.com/@jackkrupansky/ 
untangling-thedefinitions-of-artificial-intelligence-machine-intelligence-and-machine-
learning-7244882f04c7 [https://perma.cc/RVZ4-88NP]).
26. See generally ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT
WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE (rev. & updated ed. 2016) (describing how predictive 
analytics are currently being used by the government and business to identify preferences 
and risks, noting that the use of data about groups that have been historically discriminated 
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Companies have developed AI that can detect pathologies and make
diagnoses faster and more accurately than medical professionals, help the
blind with navigation, aid disaster relief, predict weather-related phenomena, 
and detect and address inequality.27  AI is also being developed in the 
commercial arena to further automate the manufacturing process, develop 
self-driving cars, predict harvest outputs, provide chatbots for customer 
services, prevent fraud, and reduce energy and employment costs.28  According
to a 2018 McKinsey Report, AI has the potential to add $13 trillion to 
current global economic output by 2030.29  The future of AI’s impact on
a country’s economic viability mandates not only that these countries plan 
for and adopt the necessary infrastructure for this technological revolution, 
but also ensure that its development proceeds responsibly.30 
against can result in discriminatory outcomes, and discussing the potential bias from the 
likelihood of errors contained in big data); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION:
HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2015) (discussing
potential risks of big data); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG 
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013).
27. Michael Chui et al., Applying Artificial Intelligence for Social Good, MCKINSEY 
GLOBAL INST. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/artificial-
intelligence/applying-artificial-intelligence-for-social-good [https://perma.cc/9UMK-XPU8].
See generally Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve the Diversity Problem in the Tech
Industry?: Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment Decision-Making, 22 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 290 (2019) (discussing how AI can be used to detect bias in employment decisions 
and remedy the impact of unconscious bias and noise through the use of AI). 
28. Guilhem Fabre, China’s Digital Transformation–Why is Artificial Intelligence
a Priority for Chinese R&D? 12 (Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Working 
Paper No. 136, 2018), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01818508v2/document 
[https://perma.cc/T22T-KJMR].
29. Jacques Bughin et al., Notes from the AI Frontier: Modeling the Impact of AI 
on the World Economy, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.
com/featured-insights/artificial-intelligence/notes-from-the-ai-frontier-modeling-the-
impact-of-ai-on-the-world-economy [https://perma.cc/2FQ7-G5XW].
30. See  ANDREA RENDA, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: ETHICS, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES 27–35 (2019), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3420810 [https://perma.cc/3P73-T3WH] (explaining the need for responsible, 
trustworthy AI); see also Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems:
Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH 353, 355–56 (2016)
(describing how AI has moved forward in the United States with virtually no government 
oversight). 
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B. Why Is AI Growing So Fast Now? 
Once considered sci-fi technology, artificial intelligence is rapidly working its
way into many facets of our daily lives and will accelerate further with the data
avalanche coming from 5G.31 
5G will drive artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, and change the world 
forever.32 
The recent AI Spring stems from a combination of technological
advancements: availability of data, increased storage and computing power, 
and increased speed in the transmission of data.33  Because the use of the 
internet and mobile devices has bourgeoned, massive amounts of data can 
be collected and processed by the companies providing these devices and 
services.34  This has created an incredible amount of data available for
employing pattern recognition algorithms and creating learning sets for 
the development of AI.35  For example, companies such as Facebook,
Google, and Amazon in the United States—and Tencent, Baidu, and Alibaba 
in China—are able to review the topics clicked on, products purchased, 
and time spent on a website to predict—with startling accuracy at times—
what a consumer will purchase next.36  Ninety percent of today’s data was 
created in the last two years.37  The second advancement is the recent increase
in storage and computer power. As chip size has decreased and computer 
storage capabilities have increased, most entities can now afford the type 
31. Yost, supra note 6. 
32. Emmer, supra note 8. 
33. See Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the 
World, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-
intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/6YU8-DKQV].
34. Ejaz Ahmed et al., Recent Advances and Challenges in Mobile Big Data, IEEE 
COMM. MAG., Feb. 2018, at 102, 102, 104–05, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8291122
[https://perma.cc/GX6G-TU3J]. It is estimated that global internet of things connections 
will reach 25 billion by 2025.  Ian Dailey, What 5G Means for Brands: 3 Takeaways from 
MWC, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 2, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/02/ 
what-5g-means-for-brands-3-takeaways-from-mwc/ [https://perma.cc/J9W3-HHZC].
35. See Andy Patrizio, Big Data vs. Artificial Intelligence, DATAMATION (May 30, 
2018), https://www.datamation.com/big-data/big-data-vs.-artificial-intelligence.html [https://
perma.cc/4GEM-WD5D] (noting that deep learning requires vast amounts of data to process
and learn from in the development of AI).
36. See Jack Morse, Facebook Isn’t the Only One with Too Much of Your Data. 
Just Ask Google and Amazon, MASHABLE (Apr. 14, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/04/ 
14/google-amazon-facebook-cambridge-analytica/ [https://perma.cc/67DF-BM3L]. 
37. Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing 
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and amount of computing power needed to conduct advanced analytics.38 
An entity need not invest in a massive computing infrastructure or data
center, but can essentially lease space in an offsite storage facility, known 
as cloud storage.39  These facilities, additionally, offer varying levels of 
solutions beyond storage, all the way up to processing data on behalf of 
the subscriber.40  The final development is speed.  Numerous technological
advances have increased both communication and processing speed, including 
fiber optics and solid-state drives,41 however, the greatest potential for AI 
revolves around 5G technology and edge computing.42  Edge computing
is the processing of data closer to the data source.43  5G technology is the 
next generation of radio transmissions that facilitate communication between 
devices, such as between your phone and your home’s security system.44 
5G speeds could be up to 100 times faster than previous iterations.45  There
are a number of challenges with 5G implementation that need to be 
addressed,46 but the inability to obtain and install the necessary equipment 
38. Harald Bauer, Pratap Ranade & Sid Tandon, Big Data and the Opportunities It
Creates for Semiconductor Players, MCKINSEY ON SEMICONDUCTORS, Autumn 2012, at 
46, 53–54 (2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/
semiconductors/issue%202%20autumn%202012/pdfs/big_data_and_the_opportunities_it
_creates_for_semiconductor_players.ashx [https://perma.cc/KU3W-V2XL].
39. What Is Cloud Computing? How Does ‘The Cloud’ Work?, FASTMETRICS, https://
www.fastmetrics.com/blog/tech/what-is-cloud-computing/ [https://perma.cc/52E8-RLL9].
40. See id. 
41. JOHN GALLAUGHER, INFORMATION SYSTEMS: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO 
HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY 78–79 (2012), https://my.uopeople.edu/pluginfile.php/57436/ 
mod_book/chapter/121629/BUS5114.Gallaugher.Information.Systems.A.Manager.Guide
.to.Harness.Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4XU-GKYQ]; see also Lifang, supra note 7
(“Scientists have known this since 1948, when an American mathematician named Claude 
Shannon determined that there is a limit to the speed at which data can be transmitted without 
error.  That’s why every breakthrough in the telecommunications infrastructure—copper, 
optical fibre, wireless transmission—has been accompanied by parallel improvements in digital 
coding technology, ensuring that data didn’t get scrambled on their high-speed journey.”). 
42. See Yost, supra note 6.
43. Xiang Sun & Nirwan Ansari, EdgeIoT: Mobile Edge Computing for the Internet 




44. Chris Hoffman, What Is 5G, and How Fast Will It Be?, HOW-TO GEEK (Mar.
15, 2019, 11:47 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/340002/what-is-5g-and-how-fast-will-
it-be/ [https://perma.cc/C8YY-57GK]. 
45. Id.
 46. Michelle Yan & Antonio Villas-Boas, 5G Networks Will Be 10 Times Faster
than 4G LTE, But We Shouldn’t Get Too Excited Yet, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2019, 2:36 
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for its widespread implementation is one of the immediate risks of the 
trade war.47 
In addition to the installation of 5G base stations48 permitting fast
communication between devices, edge computing can further reduce the 
latency in the transmission and processing of data.49  Edge computing
equipment can be installed in both devices and in, or adjacent to, the base 
stations.50  By being able to process data closer to the source, latency in 
transmission is reduced.51 This is critical for the AI systems in self-driving
cars, for example. If a child were to run out into the street chasing a ball, 
the difference between sending data to a cloud to process and processing 
data on the edge device in the vehicle or at a small cell posted next to the 
road could mean the difference between life and death. 5G provides the 
type of infrastructure that once installed will exponentially increase the 
utility of AI in the world.52 Unfortunately, this is all at risk with the move
away from globalization and towards protectionism. 
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/5g-high-speed-internet-cellular-network-issues-
switch-2019-4 [https://perma.cc/3J75-E4UA].
47. See Nick Walko, 5G – More Expensive and Delayed Without Huawei Equipment, 
WCCFTECH (Feb. 14, 2019), https://wccftech.com/5g-more-expensive-and-delayed-without-
huawei-equipment/ [https://perma.cc/YS87-6U96] (noting that sourcing 5G components
from Europe will be more expensive than using Chinese equipment and subject to delays). 
48. Tuan Nguyen, Small Cell Networks and the Evolution of 5G (Part 1), QORVO
(May 17, 2017), https://www.qorvo.com/design-hub/blog/small-cell-networks-and-the-
evolution-of-5g [https://perma.cc/2Z5Y-TDAG] (“Wireless infrastructure today includes
many elements – macro base stations, metro cells, outdoor and indoor distributed antenna 
systems (or DAS), small cells and more.”).  For the purposes herein, I will refer to the 
telecommunication networking equipment that is required for 5G as base stations or small 
cells.  Depending on the frequency band used, base stations can either be installed on current 
cell phone towers for 5G using lower frequency bands or will need to be placed much closer 
together for 5G on high frequency bands.  See id.  Because the United States is looking to 
rely on these higher frequency mmWaves initially, the infrastructure will require highly 
densified small cells.  Id. 
 49. YUN CHAO HU ET AL., EUROPEAN TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST, MOBILE EDGE 
COMPUTING:AKEYTECHNOLOGY TOWARDS 5G, at 4 (.2015), https://yucianga.info/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Ref02-2015-09-etsi_wp11_mec_a_key_technology_towards_5g.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E2BF-UQD9].
50. Scott Fulton III, What Is Edge Computing? Here’s Why the Edge Matters and Where 




52. See infra Section IV.C.1.
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III. GLOBALIZATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE
Globalization is the . . . interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures,
and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services,
technology, and flows of investment, people, and information.53 
Before discussing how the trade war is impacting 5G and AI, it is 
important to understand the concept of globalization.  Globalization 
is international cooperation through advances in communication, technology 
and transportation.54  After World War II (WWII), the United States took 
a major role in promoting globalization by reviving international trade and 
investment.55 The idea was to encourage cooperation and peace among 
countries through free trade and rules established by international organizations, 
such as the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and later by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).56  As a result of initiatives put forth by 
the former Chinese leader Deng Xaiopeng in 1978, China began to open 
up to foreign investment and permit Chinese industries to privatize.57 
These new steps into globalization allowed China to develop a middle 
53.  Melina Kolb, What Is Globalization?, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb 4,
2019), https://piie.com/microsites/globalization/what-is-globalization.html [https://perma.cc/
S5QG-W2PC].
54. Brandon Levy, The Role of Globalization in Economic Development, SSRN 
137 (Sept. 14, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2233648 [https://perma.cc/PE79-CS83]. 
55. See HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER 276 (2014).  Although the United States
has historically taken the role of international peacekeeper, the current administration 
seems intent on pursuing a path of instigation and retaliation.  See Anne Gearan & John 
Hudson, Trump’s Strong-Arm Foreign Policy Tactics Create Tensions with U.S. Friends 
and Foes, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/ 
2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/LV4B-
6E2S]; Ali Wyne, What Role Will the United States Play in the World?, WORLD ECON. F. 
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/what-role-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/6AP7-KV9N].  We are only now beginning to recognize the negative impact
on the world order that the current administration has had, but many recognize the harm 
to international relations that the trade war has caused.  The advances in the relationship 
between the two nations from Nixon through Obama have been obliterated by the current 
administration’s trade war.  See generally KISSINGER, supra, at 225–33 (explaining China’s 
ideology and agreements with previous U.S. administrations). 
56. Kolb, supra note 53. 
57. Levy, supra note 54, at 140. 
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class with money to spend, making it a market to which U.S. companies
could sell goods and services.58 
When the United States was still in a position of economic and 
technological prominence,59 both countries embraced the rewards from 
their interdependence.60 As China became more of an economic and 
security rival,61 however, the United States began to institute protectionist
measures.62  China responded in kind and both sides began justifying their 
rivalry with accusations of various wrongdoings.63  Although the countries
initially celebrated their “deep integration” as increasing both “peace and 
58. Nathan Gardels, The U.S.-China Tech Battle Is Make-or-Break, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 19, 2018, 8:47 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/
12/19/china-tech/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/3GKP-XPNV].
59. Gordon Adams, A New World Is Dawning, and the US Will No Longer Lead It, 
CONVERSATION (June 26, 2018, 6:40 AM), https://theconversation.com/a-new-world-is-
dawning-and-the-us-will-no-longer-lead-it-98362 [https://perma.cc/7NNN-PMZT] (“Not
only do China and Russia contest America’s global role, a growing number of other
countries are asserting an independent and increasingly influential role in regional economic 
and security developments.”).
60. Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes & Victor Ferguson, Toward a 
Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 662 
(2019).
61. WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC 
RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FQ-KUBQ] (“From 
1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2017, China’s real gross domestic product (GDP)
grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10%.  According to the World Bank, China
has ‘experienced the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history—and has 
lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty.’” (quoting China Overview, WORLD BANK,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170327015624/http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chi
na/overview [https://perma.cc/M7HL-S4ZV])); see also China, OBSERVATORY ECON. 
COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn/ [https://perma.cc/U4X2-W2S3] (noting 
that China is the world’s largest export economy in the world with the top categories including 
broadcasting equipment, computers, office machine parts, integrated circuits, and telephones).  
However, there is disagreement as to the success of the Chinese AI movement.  See sources 
cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
62. See Stewart M. Patrick, Trump Is Repeating the Mistakes of America’s Interwar 
Isolationists, WORLD POL. REV. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/27658/trump-is-repeating-the-mistakes-of-america-s-interwar-isolationists [https:// 
perma.cc/76UX-K3P4].
63. See Roberts, Moraes & Ferguson, supra note 60, at 664.  The United States has 
expressed concerns over a Chinese built 5G infrastructure that could give China access to 
sensitive data and the recent breakthroughs that China has made in AI that could “be used 
to power economic innovation and military advances.”  Id.  China has accused U.S.-originated 
semiconductors of containing “backdoors,” intentional vulnerabilities that can be exploited for 
intelligence and military purposes.  JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, 
LEARNING THE SUPERIOR TECHNIQUES OF THE BARBARIANS: CHINA’S PURSUIT OF 
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prosperity,” the current U.S. administration began blaming this relationship
as the cause of its own internal economic woes.64 
China’s rise to technological prominence through an integrated strategy 
that has increased its economic power is now viewed as a threat by the
current U.S. administration.65  Although China has created and promoted
a number of economic initiatives, the most relevant here are the Belt and 
Road Initiative, Made in China 2025, and the AI Development Plan.66  In 
combination, these have made China a legitimate challenger to U.S. 
economic and technology supremacy.  Rather than understanding and 
working within this new paradigm, the United States chose to detach from 
globalization and embrace protectionism.67  This has resulted in the institution 
of a series of tariffs and trade barriers aimed at China, but negatively 
impacting U.S. trade with many of its partners.68  Although many have 
called out the United States for its recent actions undermining the WTO, 
withdrawal from multilateral treaties, and instigation of a trade war with 
China,69 little attention has been brought to how this might impact the
developing field of artificial intelligence. 
64. See, e.g., BENJAMIN SHOBERT, BLAMING CHINA: IT MIGHT FEEL GOOD BUT IT 
WON’T FIX AMERICA’S ECONOMY 77–106 (2018). 
65. Carl Ciovacco, Understanding the China Threat, NAT’L INT. (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/understanding-china-threat-37502 [perma.cc/J7DA-ZFAE]. 
66. See infra Section IV.A.
 67. See Patrick, supra note 62 (discussing the Trump Administration’s concerns with
globalism and resurrection of isolationism). 
68. Joseph Parilla & Max Bouchet, Which US Communities Are Most Affected by
Chinese, EU, and NAFTA Retaliatory Tariffs?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/which-us-communities-are-most-affected-by-chinese-eu-and-nafta-retaliatory-
tariffs/ [https://perma.cc/TPB4-GA2K] (discussing retaliatory tariffs against the United States
by China, the EU, Mexico, and Canada).
69. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of the 
WTO, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 6, 6–7 (2018), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campus 
press.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2019/02/2_Brewster_YJIL-Symposium_Future-of-the-WTO
_12.04.18-1ntzggg.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5LM-UNG5] (“The Trump administration’s
attacks on the WTO, in particular, represent a shock to the norms and understandings essential 
to the agreement, not just a strike against certain trading partners or discrete policies.”); 
see also Gregory Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making? The Decline of Law and the Return 
of Power in International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 37, 37 (2018), 
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2019/02/5_Shaffer_
YJIL-Symposium_A-Tragedy-in-the-Making_12.07.18-23keh7s.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8EC-
K7T6] (“The United States created the WTO and its dispute settlement system.  Now the
United States is undoing it.  The result could be a long-term decline of multilateralism,
coupled with a new—potentially more devastating—form of cold war conflict.  This will
undermine cooperation to address urgent transnational problems.”). 
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Although industry and academia in the United States and China have
been working together for several decades in the pursuit of technological 
advancement in AI, those collaborations are now at risk.70  The Microsoft 
Research Asia Lab (MSRA) was founded in Beijing in 1988 and has 
produced numerous advances in AI.71  IBM also has an AI research center 
in China,72 as does Google.73  Fei-Fei Li, Google’s chief scientist for AI
and machine learning, stated at the center’s opening: “I believe AI and its 
benefits have no borders.  Whether a breakthrough occurs in Silicon Valley, 
Beijing or anywhere else, it has the potential to make everyone’s life better 
for the entire world.”74 During her testimony before Congress, Helen
Toner, Director of Strategy at Georgetown University’s Center for Security 
and Emerging Technology, predicted that restricting China-U.S. collaboration 
would slow down research progress at U.S. universities and corporations, 
damage the United States’ standing as a technology leader, and “reduce [its] 
market share in AI-enabled products and platforms.”75  As AI develops,
“[g]lobal governance and international cooperation will be increasingly 
important to guide the safe and beneficial development of AI while 
70. See, e.g., Stephen Chen, Chinese, US Scientists Develop AI Technology to Help 
Detect Submarines in Uncharted Waters, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 31, 2019, 
9:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3025096/chinese-us-scientists-
develop-ai-technology-help-detect [https://perma.cc/5MTR-VK2P] (describing a joint
collaboration of Chinese and American scientists that recently developed an AI system 
capable of detecting objects in uncharted waters, which could help in detecting crashed 
aircrafts, submarines, and whales). 
71. Terri Coles, Can Cross-Border Cooperation Between U.S., China Keep Artificial 
Intelligence Benefits Coming?, ITPRO TODAY (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.itprotoday.com/ 
artificial-intelligence/can-cross-border-cooperation-between-us-china-keep-artificial-
intelligence [https://perma.cc/68P4-3NGF]. 
72. IBM Research – China: About Us, IBM, https://www.research.ibm.com/labs/china/
[https://perma.cc/G88W-L9ZJ].
73. Patrick Caughill, Google Opened an AI Research Center in Beijing, FUTURISM
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://futurism.com/google-opened-research-center-beijing [https://perma.cc/ 
D2Q8-TEP8]. Google has three AI research centers in China—“the Google AI China 
Center in Beijing . . . and partnerships with China’s two premier educational institutions, 
Peking University and Tsinghua University.”  Gordon Chang, America Can Stop China from
Dominating Artificial Intelligence—And Should, GATESTONE INST. INT’L POL’Y COUNCIL
(Aug. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14731/america-can-stop-
china-from-dominating-artificial [https://perma.cc/Y9L9-HKEK]. 
74. Caughill, supra note 73. 
75. U.S. Scientists, Policy Advisors Oppose Restrictions on Collaboration with 
China, CHINA PLUS (June 8, 2019, 9:03 PM), http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/2019 
0608/300220.html [https://perma.cc/Z7RX-CFRR].  Other experts giving testimony in front of
Congress indicated that American research has relied on foreign-born individuals and called for 
the end of intimidation of Chinese scientists in the United States.  Id. 
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reducing race conditions and national and global security threats.”76  The 
current move away from globalization will forestall advances in AI, which 
rely on 5G as well as the installation of the needed infrastructure itself.77 
IV. PROTECTIONISM AND REJECTIONISM
The Trump Administration is carrying out a new form of American rejectionism 
powered by four horsemen of economic instability: first, the rejection of the 
international rule of law; second, the rejection of open markets; third, the
rejection of economic peace in favour of perpetual economic war; and fourth, the 
rejection of the global interest.78 
Trade protectionism is a national policy designed to “protect[] domestic 
industries from unfair competition from foreign ones.”79  The term
“rejectionism,” used by scholar Steve Charnovitz of George Washington 
University, reflects the actions of the current administration in rejecting 
open trade and the rule of international law.80  It is a step well beyond 
traditional protectionism resulting in an apparent rejection of the concept 
of globalization itself. Recent actions by President Trump are not just an 
attack on the trade policies of China, but on its allies, enemies, and the 
76. AI Policy Challenges and Recommendations, FUTURE OF LIFE INST., https://future
oflife.org/ai-policy-challenges-and-recommendations/#Governance [https://perma.cc/9KSR- 
F43W].
77. Although this article focuses on the trade war’s impact on the future of artificial 
intelligence and the United States’ position as a technological leader, some are concerned 
that it may also be a precursor to actual war.  See, e.g., Daniel Drezner, Will Today’s Global 
Trade Wars Lead to World War III?, REASON (May 2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/04/ 
will-todays-global-trade-wars/ [https://perma.cc/RSR2-WAZ2].  When countries no longer rely 
economically upon one another, there is less of an incentive to keep the peace.  Id. 
 78. Steve Charnovitz, How American Rejectionism Undermines International Economic 
Law, 10 TRADE L. & DEV. 226, 226 (2018). 
 79. Kimberly Amadeo, Trade Protectionism Methods With Examples, Pros, and Cons, 
BALANCE (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-protectionism-3305896 
[https://perma.cc/M395-EFDZ]; see also Brewster, supra note 69, at 11 (explaining how 
the United States has created a “strategy of rejecting the WTO’s bindings as legitimate, 
attempting to undermine the WTO’s rule of law system, and embracing a return to 
unilateralism and power-based bargaining”). 
80. Charnovitz, supra note 78, at 226. 
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international world order.81  After decades of international cooperation, 
the U.S. government has shifted to a new model of protectionism.82 
The WTO is the premier international trade regime creating international
trade rules and arbitrating disputes with an extremely high level of
compliance.83  The founding premise of the WTO is “open trade for the 
benefit of all.”84  As part of his new protectionist scheme, President Trump 
has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from this organization, which, 
among other things could have the effect of moving China into a more 
prominent leadership role within the organization.85  Additionally, Trump 
has refused to fill the vacancies on the WTO Appellate Board, repudiated 
multilateral agreements, and instituted both improper unilateral trade sanctions 
on China and a series of tariffs on imports affecting many countries.86 
Ironically, these actions have put China in the role of “chief defender 
of an open global trading system, with some observers predicting that China 
is indeed headed towards replacing the dominant United States in global
economic governance.”87  There are a number of consequences resulting 
from this rejectionism, including the disruption of supply chains, decreased 
trade and foreign investment, state market fluctuations, and increased 
costs for consumers.  However, most relevant here is the impact on technological 
goods, services, and intellectual property.88  Trade barriers not only damage
economic growth and international cooperation but serve to pit former 
allies against one another due to economic concerns as will be discussed 
herein.89 
81. See Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, Trump’s Assault on the Global Trading
System and why Decoupling from China Will Change Everything, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 12,
2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-08-12/trumps-assault-
global-trading-system [https://perma.cc/5FSQ-VCGS].
82. See David A. Andelman, Trump Is Taking Us Back to Depression-Era Trade 
Policy, CNN BUSINESS (Sept. 1, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/30/
perspectives/smoot-hawley-tariff-act-trump-trade/index.html [https://perma.cc/38UB-2WHT]. 
83. Brewster, supra note 69, at 7, 9.
 84. What Is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VC5A-9HVC].
85. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, Would a US Exit from the 
WTO Unravel Global Trade?, WORLD ECON.F. (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2016/08/would-a-us-exit-from-the-wto-unravel-global-trade/ [https://perma.cc/VU9P-JXBC]
(“US withdrawal from the WTO would hand leadership of the world trading system to 
China.”).
86. Brewster, supra note 69, at 8–10. 
87. Marcia Don Harpaz, China and the WTO: On a Path to Leadership?, in HANDBOOK 
ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA 260, 264 (Zeng Ka ed., 2018). 
88. See Linda Yueh, How a US-China Trade War Would Hurt Us All, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 5, 2018, 4:54 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/05/us-china- 
trade-war-supply-chains-consumers [https://perma.cc/GV2H-7MPH].
89. See Kolb, supra note 53. 
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The current move towards decoupling fails to account for the interdependency
of these regions and is especially harmful to technological advances.  The 
problem is that firms in every country rely on foreign technology and
suppliers.90  Much of the EU’s 4G infrastructure relies on Chinese-made
equipment with EU telecom providers having entered into long-term 
partnerships with these Chinese companies.91  Additionally, much of the
rural United States is covered by 3G and 4G systems comprised of Chinese 
components from Huawei and ZTE.92  Consequently, the new U.S. restrictions
on the importation of hardware and the export of technology will impair 
future development in the United States and abroad.93 The trade war will 
slow down 5G installation worldwide as well as greatly increase costs in 
the United States and for any other country refusing to do business with 
China.94  The following subparts outline China’s economic rise and its
strategic plan for becoming a leader in AI innovation by 2030, the United 
States’ failure of policy for AI and 5G, its instigation of a trade war, and 
the resulting harms. 
A. China 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature project, the multi-trillion dollar “Belt
and Road Initiative” (BRI) stretches across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
Europe, and represents the largest infrastructure project in history.  Constructing
90. See Koen de Backer & Norihiko Yamano, International Comparative Evidence 
on Global Value Chains 6 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Sci., Tech. & Indus. Working 
Paper No. 2012/3, 2012), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/international- 
comparative-evidence-on-global-value-chains_5k9bb2vcwv5j-en [https://perma.cc/UMQ6-
VQFH].
91. See Leonid Bershidsky, A Huawei Ban Makes Little Sense for Europe, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION (Feb. 1, 2019, 4:50 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-
01/huawei-telecom-equipment-ban-makes-little-sense-for-europe [https://perma.cc/CG4B-
6226].
92. Zen Soo, Trump’s Huawei Ban Will Hit Rural US Carriers the Hardest As 
Replacing Equipment Will Cost ‘Millions’, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 4, 2019, 
7:03 AM) (“About 25 per cent of Rural Wireless Association (RWA) members use telecoms 
equipment from prohibited Chinese companies named in the NDAA, the Washington DC-
based trade association said in its comments to the FCC.”). 
93. See infra Section IV.C.1.
 94. See Arjun Kharpal, Here’s How Trump’s Latest Executive Order Could Affect 
Huawei, CNBC (May 15, 2019, 10:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/huawei-
us-5g-block-after-trump-executive-order.html [https://perma.cc/B2CM-6XAT].  According to
a Huawei company statement, “[r]estricting Huawei from doing business in the US will 
not make the US more secure or stronger; instead, this will only serve to limit the US to inferior 
yet more expensive alternatives, leaving the US lagging behind in 5G deployment.”  Id. 
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a comprehensive trade network for Chinese goods, BRI offers a platform for
China’s long-term strategic shift around advanced technologies.  This includes
electric vehicles (EV), telecommunications, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), 
semiconductors, clean energy technology, advanced electrical equipment, rail
infrastructure and maritime engineering.95 
After China began opening up its economy to foreign investment in
1978, cooperation grew between China and the United States.96  When China 
joined the WTO in 2001, it began to cut tariffs and remove trade barriers, 
slowly opening up its market as well.97  Over time, China became one of 
the main importers of U.S. goods and services.98  In an effort to move
away from manufacturing towards becoming a high-tech provider, China 
has created long-term strategic plans to meet its goal of becoming a world 
leader in AI.99  China has demonstrated an understanding of how technology 
has shifted “the nature of power with emerging economies gaining a 
competitive advantage.”100 Part of China’s strategy to become an economic
superpower is to leverage this geotechnical shift and move from being an 
emerging market to expanding into emerging markets.101  The following 
is a description of strategic plans instituted by China in this regard: the Belt 
and Road Initiative, Made in China 2025, and the Next Generation AI 
Development Plan. 
1. Belt and Road Initiative 
While the United States has been decreasing its role as a global leader 
in the promotion of free trade and globalization, China has sought to use 
this as an opportunity to increase its prominence in the world through its 
Belt and Road Initiative.102  The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was established 
in 2013 to expand China’s economic power in the world by increasing 
 95. Daniel Araya, China’s Grand Strategy, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2019, 11:28 AM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/danielaraya/2019/01/14/chinas-grand-strategy/#197f92941f18 
[https://perma.cc/4QZH-W7E5].
96. See MORRISON, supra note 61, at 1, 4. See generally KISSINGER, supra note 55, 
at 212–33 (explaining China’s ideology and agreements with various U.S. administrations). 
97. Kolb, supra note 53. 
98. The People’s Republic of China, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ 
countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china [https://perma.cc/F2J3-
YWB8].
99. See Waugh, supra note 15.  However, there is disagreement as to the success of
the Chinese AI movement.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
100. Araya, supra note 95. 
101. Id. 
102. See Joshua P. Meltzer, China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the United 
States, BROOKINGS (June 19, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-
one-road-initiative-a-view-from-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/DVM3-DVMV]. 
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exports and helping other countries build their infrastructure.103  President
Xi set aside $113 billion for this project and has met with other countries 
to encourage them to join in this initiative.104 China is seeking to be the primary 
supplier to over sixty countries in terms of infrastructure, including roads, 
bridges, pipelines, ports, railways, power plants, and the infrastructure for 
5G telecommunications equipment.105 
China’s BRI is an attempt to increase trade with specific partners in Europe, 
Asia, and Africa.106  The Belt refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the Road refers to the Maritime Silk Road.107  The BRI loosely tracks the 
known route of Marco Polo.108  China has identified sixty-four target nations 
which, together with China, comprise “62% of the world’s population and 
30% of its economic output.”109  The multi-nation initiatives include pipelines, 
railways, but of particular relevance—telecoms.110  The Digital Silk Road 
will construct communications networks across Asia, Europe, and Africa.111 
China is planning on building “fiber optic cables, international trunk 
passageways, mobile structures and e-commerce links” in the countries 
connected to the BRI.112  This is enormously attractive to developing nations
lacking the money, technology, and current infrastructure to manage this 
103. How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests?, CHINAPOWER
(May 8, 2017), https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/
CN3D-XDV4].
104. See Zheping Huang, Your Guide to Understanding OBOR, China’s New Silk 
Road Plan, QUARTZ (May 15, 2017), https://qz.com/983460/obor-an-extremely-simple-
guide-to-understanding-chinas-one-belt-one-road-forum-for-its-new-silk-road/ [https:// 
perma.cc/P79C-DUVQ]. 
105. Id.; see also Susan Crawford, China Will Likely Corner the 5G Market—and the US 
Has No Plan, WIRED (Feb. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/china-will-
likely-corner-5g-market-us-no-plan/ [https://perma.cc/FQV7-HQJJ].
106. See Huang, supra note 104.
 107. Id.
 108. GABRIEL WONG, SIMON BOOKER & GUILLAUME BARTHE-DEJEAN, PRICEWATER 
HOUSECOOPERS, CHINA AND BELT & ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 5 (2017), https://www.pwchk.
com/en/consulting/br-watch-infrastructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG53-AFZG]. 
109. Huang, supra note 104. 
110. See WONG, BOOKER & BARTHE-DEJEAN, supra note 108, at 3. 
111. See Andrew Kitson & Kenny Liew, China Doubles Down on Its Digital Silk 
Road, RECONNECTING ASIA (Nov. 14, 2019), https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/ 
china-doubles-down-its-digital-silk-road/ [https://perma.cc/8LV5-GRUC].
112. Nyshka Chandran, Surveillance Fears Cloud China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’  ,
CNBC (July 11, 2018, 10:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/11/risks-of-chinas-digital-
silk-road-surveillance-coercion.html [https://perma.cc/89MZ-UZEF]. 
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on their own.113 It may also serve to prevent the United States from entering 
these markets due to Chinese exclusivity agreements.114 
China began planning for 5G in 2013 with the creation of an advisory 
board to oversee the national strategy and rollout.115  In addition to being
on track to provide investment and infrastructure for nearly 65% of the 
world’s global population, through its BRI plan to place fiber-optic cables 
alongside trans-Eurasian rail lines, it is also on track to roll out 5G and 
fiber-optic connections reaching 80% of China’s population.116  China’s
plan for 5G includes standardization of equipment, massive R&D investment 
in the development of new technology, support for industries that manufacture 
the infrastructure, and test beds for 5G innovations.117  Instead of creating
its own standards for 5G, China officially ratified the interim 5G non-
standalone standards set by 3GPP, a collaboration of telecom standards 
boards, in 2017.118  Additionally, China has chosen to rely primarily on the 
midrange band, 3 GHz to 6 GHz, for its 5G spectrum.119 
2. Made in China 2025
In 2015, President Xi initiated the Made in China 2025 (MIC2025)
strategic plan designed to increase China’s competitiveness in high-tech
industries and reduce their reliance on foreign technology.120  While China
was formerly viewed as a “copycat” manufacturer, its shift to high-tech 
113. See Belt and Road Initiative Explained: How China Is Looking Beyond Borders, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/ 
article/3007692/belt-and-road/index.html [https://perma.cc/683T-2D5G].
114. Crawford, supra note 105. 
115. Josh Chin, The Internet, Divided Between the U.S. and China, Has Become a 
Battleground, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
internet-divided-between-the-u-s-and-china-has-become-a-battleground-11549688420 
[https://perma.cc/A5WD-XQ8T].
116. Crawford, supra note 105. 
117. ERNST & YOUNG, CHINA IS POISED TO WIN THE 5G RACE 4–8 (2018), https://
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-china-is-poised-to-win-the-5g-race-en/$FILE/
ey-china-is-poised-to-win-the-5g-race-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS8Z-EYA2].
118. Id. at 5. 
119. Id. at 28–30.  China will also utilize the higher spectrum to target hot spots but 
is willing to open up bands as needed.  See id. at 9, 28–29.  The United States, however, 
has opened up the higher spectrums for 5G, which require an enormously high density of 
cell stations and has so far failed to open up the desirable midrange bands for 5G.  Id. at 
16, 28, 30, 33. 
120. See Alex Lockie, Trump Said Xi Jinping Abandoned a Signature Economic 
Initiative Because He Told Him It Was Insulting, BUS. INSIDER (June 10, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-xi-jinpings-made-in-china-2025-insult-and-
cancelled-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/6X75-DFZZ]. China is transitioning from a manufacturing
giant to a next-generation information technology leader.  MORRISON, supra note 61, at 
36. 
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products has been highly successful.121  In 2018, for example, Huawei
filed for more patents with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
than any other company in the world.122 China’s Alibaba Group and Tencent 
Holdings “lead the world in e-commerce, mobile payments, social media, 
and online gaming.”123  Part of the reason for these companies’ success is
the large local market due to the rising of the new middle class, the speed 
with which the Chinese adopt new technology, and the relatively closed 
trade borders which keep many foreign competitors out, as well as 
government subsidies to industry.124  Chinese tech companies are also quickly 
expanding abroad into gaming, ride-sharing and R&D with investments in 
American, Indian, and Singaporean companies, as well as centers in San 
Mateo, California; Bellevue, Washington; Moscow; Tel Aviv; and Singapore.125 
As part of the MIC2025 goal of decreasing reliance on foreign-sourced
chips, President Xi allocated $150 billion in public and private funds to raise
domestic chip production to 50% by 2020 and to be a legitimate world chip
maker by 2030.126  China relies on imports for 84% of its semiconductor
121. Clay Chandler, Why China Is Emerging as a Tech Superpower to Rival the U.S., 
FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2017/11/21/china-innovation-dji/
[https://perma.cc/YQ4M-4P3C].
122. See Tom Miles, Huawei Leads Asian Domination of U.N. Patent Applications 
in 2018, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-
ip/huawei-leads-asian-domination-of-u-n-patent-applications-in-2018-idUSKCN1QZ2PP 
[https://perma.cc/U5MT-LF4].
123. Chandler, supra note 121.  “China is now among the world’s top three markets 
globally for venture capital in digital technologies including virtual reality, autonomous vehicles, 
3D printing, drones, and artificial intelligence.  And about a third of the world’s 262 ‘unicorns’ 
(startups valued at more than a billion dollars) hail from China, according to McKinsey & 
Co., and account for 43% of the global value of such companies.”  Id. 
124. See id.; Kimberly Amadeo, China’s Economy and Its Effect on the U.S. Economy, 
BALANCE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/china-economy-facts-effect-on-
us-economy-3306345 [https://perma.cc/ZZU5-DHEP]; Adam Jourdan et al., Factbox: Barrier
to Entry – China’s Restrictions on U.S. Imports, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2018, 12:38 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-factbox/factbox-barrier-to-entry-chinas-
restrictions-on-u-s-imports-idUSKCN1GQ0PQ [https://perma.cc/R5DP-Y7H8].
125. Chandler, supra note 121. 
126. Id. China seems to be making headway in increasing local production of 5G
chips.  See James Kynge & Mercedes Ruehl, China Accelerates 5G Chip Plans, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/547560a8-b8f7-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203 [https:// 
perma.cc/FR23-EBXC]. Initially two years behind Qualcomm in terms of production, it appears 
that Chinese Unisoc has shortened this gap to six months. Id.
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needs.127  Huawei, Xiaomi, and Alibaba Funding are developing custom 
chips with funding from MIC2025.128  MIC2025 has been labeled as “unfair” 
by the current U.S. administration.129 
3. China’s AI Development Plan 
In 2017, China created its Next Generation AI Development Plan (AIDP) 
with the goal of becoming a world leader in AI technology by 2030.130 
The plan includes strategic investment, purchases of foreign companies
with needed technological know-how, and billions in start-up funding.131 
The existing Ministry of Science and Technology and new AI Plan 
Promotion Office are authorized to coordinate AI-related projects and 
make recommendations for government sponsorship.132  Additionally, 240
companies and governmental organizations have created an AI Alliance, 
which will “promote integration of AI resources.”133  President Xi has
suggested that the leader in AI will be at the forefront of global military 
and economic power.134  Although the AIDP focuses on the commercialization 
of AI, it also highlights China’s desire to be a leader in global governance 
of AI.135  The plan also notes the need for agreed-upon international 
127. Puja Tayal, China Accelerates Its Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency Efforts, MKT. 
REALIST (June 6, 2019), https://marketrealist.com/2019/06/china-accelerates-its-semiconductor- 
self-sufficiency-efforts/ [https://perma.cc/H9CD-N949].
128. See id.
129.  Jane Cai, Why China’s Subsidised State-Owned Enterprises Anger US, Europe
– And Its Own Private Companies, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 21, 2019, 6:00 
AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2184707/why-chinas-subsidised-
state-owned-enterprises-anger-us-europe [https://perma.cc/A7ZW-5RFF]. See discussion 
infra Section IV.B.1. 
130. Graham Webster et al., Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial 
Intelligence Development Plan’ (2017), NEW AM. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.newamerica.org/
cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-
intelligence-development-plan-2017/ [https://perma.cc/GE9F-USQM]. Note that translators 
differ on whether it is titled “New” or “Next.”  Id. 
131. See id. 
132. See AI Policy – China, FUTURE LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/ai-policy-china/
[https://perma.cc/6ZNC-LTCH].
133. Cheng Yu, China Calls for AI Alliance, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:36 PM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-10/13/content_33216440.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
7B5L-DNVW].
134. Gregory C. Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy, CTR. FOR NEW AM. SECURITY 
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standards and cooperation in setting rules for international security and 
potential military uses.136 
While China has already shown its ability to ramp up its technology 
industries, especially telecommunications networking equipment, it has 
become laser-focused on AI.  Toutiao, for example, a start-up which uses 
AI to create curated news feeds, has raised over $1 billion in investments.137 
Additionally, Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba were named China’s “AI National
Team” to spur development in eight AI product categories, including self-
driving cars.138  China is also focusing on building a comprehensive AI 
infrastructure, which is most likely the reason for its superiority in 5G 
technology.139 
China recognizes the enormous potential of AI and has been fostering 
it with a national strategy.  It has made its AIDP a high priority for its
government and private industry and has instituted multiple initiatives to 
further its goal of becoming a world leader in AI.  The U.S. strategy is
largely reactive.  Instead of developing and funding a comprehensive plan 
for AI, the current administration has relied on private industry to move it 
forward, cut off needed suppliers of components, and made the recruitment
of AI talent more difficult.140 
136. Id. (noting that although government and industry in China are concerned about 
the potential threat to national security that AI poses, they agree that militarization is 
inevitable). 
137. Chandler, supra note 121.  Toutiao’s parent company, Bytedance, which owns 
TikTok, is valued at over $78 billion.  Yingzhi Yang & Brenda Goh, China Orders ByteDance’s 
Toutiao to Fix Search, Saying National Hero Smeared, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2019, 9:29 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-bytedance/china-orders-bytedances-toutiao-to- 
fix-search-saying-national-hero-smeared-idUSKBN1XM0G1 [https://perma.cc/6HSJ-LZ8E]. 
138. Sophie-Charlotte Fischer, Artificial Intelligence: China’s High-Tech Ambitions, 
CTR. FOR SECURITY STUD. 2–3 (Feb. 2018), https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/
gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse220-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/48XE-
G9Q2].
139. See id. at 3; see also CK Tan, China Mobile and Huawei Switch on First Piece 
of 5G Network, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (June 29, 2019, 12:55 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/
Spotlight/5G-networks/China-Mobile-and-Huawei-switch-on-first-piece-of-5G-network
[https://perma.cc/22H8-4T4B] (noting that China has been working on the installation of
the 5G network since 2016 and will begin the commercial roll out in October 2019 with 
its 50,000 base stations). 
140. See infra Section IV.B.
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B. United States 
[T]he Trump administration’s trade policies give China a path to rewrite global
trade rules.  China is and will be increasingly important to the future of global 
trade because of its expanding market size, but the Trump administration’s
actions have weakened international institutions that would have provided
a globally supported set of constraints to channel this increased power.141 
In 2016 while President Obama was still in office, the U.S. government 
laid out a comprehensive AI strategy that included significant government 
investment in AI research and called for “collaboration among researchers to
address the ethical, legal, and societal implications of AI.”142  The plan 
also addressed AI for social good, ensuring the security and trustworthiness 
of AI systems, developing high quality data sets, AI research centers, 
143developing standards, and improving the AI workforce.   The official 
policy built on previous task force work during Obama’s eight years in 
office.144  Of particular significance is the understanding that government 
funding is crucial for the development and guidance of AI.145  The strategy 
laid out in this report was never implemented by the Trump Administration.146 
In 2017, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin opined that job loss due to 
AI was another 50 to 100 years out, drastically underestimating the state 
141. Brewster, supra note 69, at 7.
 142. Brian Higgins, Obama, Trump, and the Regulation of Artificial Intelligence, 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECH. & L. (June 6, 2018), http://aitechnologylaw.com/2018/ 
06/obama-trump-regulation-of-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/9X9Z-8Z6Y].
143. See generally COMM. ON TECH., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR
THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) [hereinafter COMM. ON TECH.] https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NST
C/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CLW-HQ7Q]. 
144. See id. at 25–26. During the Obama Administration, there was significant
attention to the future of AI.  “In 2015, the U.S. Government’s investment in unclassified 
R&D in AI-related technologies was approximately $1.1 billion.”  Id. at 25; NSTC REPORT 
ON AI, supra note 22, at 6. 
    Other R&D strategic plans and initiatives of relevance to this AI R&D 
Strategic Plan include the Federal Big Data Research and Development Strategic
Plan, the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Strategic Plan, the National
Privacy Research Strategy, the National Nanotechnology Initiative Strategic 
Plan, the National Strategic Computing Initiative, the Brain Research through Advancing
Innovative Neurotechnologies Initiative, and the National Robotics Initiative. 
NSTC REPORT ON AI, supra note 22, at 6–7 (citations omitted).
145. See COMM. ON TECH., supra note 143, at 26 (“Recommendation 13: The Federal 
government should prioritize basic and long-term AI research.  The Nation as a whole would 
benefit from a steady increase in Federal and private-sector AI R&D, with a particular 
emphasis on basic research and long-term, high-risk research initiatives.  Because basic 
and long-term research especially are areas where the private sector is not likely to invest, 
Federal investments will be important for R&D in these areas.”). 
146. See Shirin Ghaffary, Trump’s Executive Order on AI, Explained, VOX (Feb. 13, 
2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/13/18222433/trump-executive-order-
ai-explained [https://perma.cc/7Z4U-5WC5].
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of AI technology, at the same time China was allocating $150 billion to
the AI industry.147  Although the White House issued the American AI
Initiative in 2019, it provides no new funding and seems to ask federal 
agencies to reallocate their budget requests to include AI projects.148  This
lack of a true strategy to guide and fund the development of AI is further 
compounded by the trade war initiated by President Trump.  In fact, some 
have suggested that it is the realization that the United States is falling 
behind China in AI that prompted the trade war.149 
1. Rationale for Trade War 
A trade war occurs when one country imposes tariffs on another,
ostensibly to protect local industry from unfair foreign trade practices, and 
in return the affected country retaliates with tariffs of their own.  The 
initiation of the trade war by President Trump was spurred by his belief 
that the current trade deficit of $419 billion with China, up from $376
billion in 2017, is the result of “unfair trade practices” by China.150 There 
are two problems with this assertion.  First, this figure does not take into
account global supply chains.151  Second, many economists agree that 
147. Nicholas Thompson & Ian Bremmer, The AI Cold War That Threatens Us All, 
WIRED (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-cold-war-china-could-
doom-us-all/ [https://perma.cc/2AD9-Y3M5].
148. See Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967, 3968 (Feb. 11, 2019).  The 
2020 budget requests by federal agencies include $1 billion for AI research, but private 
industry has criticized this amount as being wholly insufficient.  Sara Castellanos, Executives 
Say $1 Billion for AI Research Isn’t Enough, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/executives-say-1-billion-for-ai-research-isnt-enough-11568153863 [https://perma.cc/
A59A-UHJW].
149. See Aidan Yao, Trade War? No, the US and China Are Vying for Technological 
Supremacy, and the Markets Are Catching on, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 6, 
2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3013064/trade-war-no-
us-and-china-are-vying-technological-supremacy-and [https://perma.cc/L3NA-KA8T]; cf. 
Michael Martina & Kevin Yao, Amid Crises, Frayed U.S. Ties Give China’s Xi Political 
Cover at Home, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2019, 2:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-politics-xi-analysis/amid-crises-frayed-u-s-ties-give-chinas-xi-political-cover-at-
home-idUSKCN1V60RX?utm_source=applenews [https://perma.cc/Q9AJ-TJ3D] (“[R]ight
now in China, the rising consensus is that the U.S. is trying to contain China no matter
what we do.”). 
150. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10030, U.S.-CHINA TRADE 
ISSUES 1–2 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10030.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3W4-KWX3]. 
151. See Joel W. Schoen, The Apple iPhone Shows that Trump Is Misreading Trade 
Deficits and What They Mean, CNBC (June 19, 2018, 12:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/06/19/trump-is-wrong-on-tariffs-and-trade-just-look-at-his-iphone.html [https://perma.cc/
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a trade deficit is a function of “low domestic savings relative to its
investment needs, rather than the result of foreign trade barriers.”152  With 
respect to trade deficits, George P. Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of Labor, 
Treasury and State, and Martin Feldman, Professor of Economics at Harvard, 
and former Chair of the U.S. Council on Economic Advisers, explains:  “‘If 
a country consumes more than it produces, it must import more than it exports.  
That’s not a rip-off[;] that’s arithmetic.’ [T]he trade deficit cannot be ‘fixed’ 
by taking measures that close the deficit with one or a few countries.”153 
The U.S. administration has justified its unilateral actions citing:
(1) intellectual property rights and cybertheft, (2) Chinese policies that
protect Chinese businesses, (3) direct foreign investment by China in U.S. 
154 tech companies, and (4) cybersecurity.
a. Intellectual Property Rights and Cybertheft 
Numerous officials in the Trump Administration have expressed concerns 
that China is involved in theft of intellectual property (IP) from U.S.
companies.155  The assertion is that China uses espionage and cyberattacks
to obtain American IP, fails to enforce American IP rights in China, and 
engages in forced technology transfers.156  Espionage and cybertheft 
accusations have long been asserted against China by the United States.157 
U93B-Q3EF].  In 2018, the United States imported $236.4 billion of computers, electronics,
and electrical equipment from China, which contain parts made elsewhere that are not 
factored into the $419 billion figure. See Jeffry Bartash, Why the U.S.-China Trade Deficit
Is So Huge: Here’s All the Stuff America Imports, MKT. WATCH (June 27, 2019, 11:10
AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-all-the-stuff-the-us-imports-from-china-
thats-causing-a-huge-trade-deficit-2018-03-23 [https://perma.cc/W3FR-HUPY].  To use 
the example of an iPhone, of the $1,000 price, $370 represents the cost of making the 
phone, but only $30–60 actually goes to China; the rest goes to the suppliers of the components, 
such as Samsung in South Korea, Toshiba in Japan, and SK Hynix in South Korea. Schoen, 
supra. However, the entire $370 is allocated as a Chinese export to the United States; this 
artificially inflates the deficit with China.  Id. 
 152. MORRISON, supra note 150, at 1.
153. Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perils of Economic 
Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 
121 (2019) (quoting George P. Shultz & Martin Feldstein, Everything You Need to Know 




154. MORRISON, supra note 150, at 1–2. 
155. Id. at 1. 
156. See Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property and Technology: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Energy 
& Commerce, 113 Cong. 6–7 (2013) (statement of Hon. Tim Murphy). 
157. See, e.g., Angela Mia Beam, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, 
4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 335 (1995). In 2015, the United States and China agreed to proscribe 
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The evidence for the assertion that China engages in Forced Technology 
Transfers (FTT) appears to be a survey of 434 companies doing business 
in China where 21% indicated that they “felt pressure to transfer technology 
in exchange for market access.”158  According to Peter Drysdale, a professor 
at the Australian National University: 
All catching-up economies, including in the US, have acquired the technologies
of more technologically advanced economies to engineer their industrial growth.  
Most of it is not stolen.
Most technology is purchased directly or through purchasing advanced machinery
and equipment and it is learned. In the process, technology is adapted and it is
also created.  China is no different.159 
While acknowledging that there may be some actual instances of forced
technology transfers, Sourabh Gupta, a senior policy specialist with the 
Institute for China-America Studies in Washington, indicated that if these
allegations were true, an action could have been brought to the WTO,
implying that China’s policies regarding technology transfers is in line with 
international commitments.160 With respect to IP enforcement, a report 
by Santa Clara University School of Law indicates that foreign firms filing 
patent infringement cases in China actually won 70% of the time.161  The
allegations of the U.S. government may be overstated.  It should be noted 
that most AI programming languages created by U.S. tech companies are 
open source, meaning that companies anywhere in the world could build 
off of them.162 It is also possible that the Chinese market is so attractive
industrial espionage, which, according to cybersecurity companies, resulted in a steep decline
in Chinese espionage and cyberattacks to obtain American IP in 2016; however, there is 
concern that it may be on the rise again due to the trade war.  Adam Segal, A New Old Threat:
Countering the Return of Chinese Industrial Cyber Espionage, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/threat-chinese-espionage [https://perma.cc/Y9JN-
AT5E].
158. Jane Cai & Keegan Elmer, Is the US Right to Cry Foul About Forced Technology
Transfer to Do Business in China – And What Is Beijing’s Position?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 





161. Brian Love, Christian Helmers & Markus Eberhardt, Patent Litigation in China:
Protecting Rights or the Local Economy?, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 740 (2016). 
162. See Kayla Matthews, Why Nearly All Major Tech Companies Are Open-Sourcing 
Their AI Technology, BORN2INVEST (Nov. 7, 2018), https://born2invest.com/articles/major-
tech-companies-open-sourcing-ai-technology/ [https://perma.cc/PV6A-4SKK]. 
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to U.S. companies because of its size that technology transfers are considered
the cost of doing business there.163  Recently, China’s Huawei indicated that
the United States “had launched cyber-attacks to infiltrate its networks and 
was threatening its employees.”164  Cyberattacks and espionage are very
difficult to prove, and as such these threats by both sides are impossible to 
verify.165  Because of the difficulty in proving the source of a cyberattack
or espionage, no one can really determine with the technology available 
today the extent of behind the scenes cybertheft between the United States 
and China. 
b. Chinese Policies that Protect Chinese Businesses
As part of MIC2025, the Chinese government has provided funding, 
favorable loans, tax breaks, and other subsidies to industries such as “[n]ext 
generation IT; high-end numerical control machinery and robotics; aerospace 
and aviation equipment; maritime engineering equipment and high-tech 
maritime vessel manufacturing; advanced rail equipment; energy-saving
vehicles and NEVs; electrical equipment; agricultural machinery and
equipment; new materials; and biopharmaceuticals and high-performance
medical devices.”166  President Trump has stated that the Chinese government’s
163. These are complicated issues with no clear answer. For a full discussion, see 
Lee G. Branstetter, China’s Forced Technology Transfer Problem—And What to Do About It 
(Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB 18-13, 2018), https://www.piie.com/system/files/
documents/pb18-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7DH-Q3JE].
164. Huawei Accuses US of Cyber-Attacks and Threats to Staff, BBC NEWS (Sept.
4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49574890 [https://perma.cc/ZB5R-Z6K9]. 
165. Both the United States and China deny accusations of espionage.  See, e.g., Sam
Bocetta, Chinese State Sponsored Hacking, REAL CLEAR DEFENSE (Nov. 23, 2017), 
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/11/23/chinese_state_sponsored_hacking
_112675.html [https://perma.cc/T6FF-6JLD]; Rogier Creemers, Why the U.S.’ Cyber 
Sanctions Against China Will Have Little Effect, CHINA US FOCUS (Sept. 7, 2015),
https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/why-the-u-s-cyber-sanctions-against-china-
will-have-little-effect [https://perma.cc/MH66-2BHH]; Philip Wen, China Denies ‘Slanderous’ 
Economic Espionage Charges from U.S., Allies, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2018, 4:59 PM) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-cyber-usa-ministry/china-denies-slanderous-
economic-espionage-charges-from-u-s-allies-idUSKCN1OK03Y [https://perma.cc/C268-
9W4V]. The largest global cyberattack in history is believed to have originated from 
technology developed by the U.S. National Security Agency.  Chris Graham, NHS Cyber
Attack: Everything You Need to Know About ‘Biggest Ransomware’ Offensive in History, 
TELEGRAPH (May 20, 2017, 1:36 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/ 
nhs-cyber-attack-everything-need-know-biggest-ransomware-offensive/ [https://perma.cc/
LAU3-TKJ2]. 
166. EUROPEAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, CHINA MANUFACTURING 2025: 
PUTTING INDUSTRIAL POLICY AHEAD OF MARKET FORCES 1 n.1, 16–20 (2017), http://docs. 
dpaq.de/12007-european_chamber_cm2025-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFH2-H9JA].
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subsidies of various industries give them an unfair advantage.167  Of course, 
the U.S. government also subsidizes industries such as oil, agriculture, 
and ethanol.168 Although there is disagreement on the impact of Chinese 
subsidies to local firms and their impact on the United States, it does seem 
that it permits U.S. consumers the ability to purchase products at lower 
prices than available elsewhere.169  In fact, according to a U.S.-China Business 
Council survey, even with China’s tariffs, 78% of U.S. companies have 
indicated that importing from China was either cheaper or the same as 
importing from other countries, and 97% stated that their Chinese operations 
were profitable.170  The real unstated but underlying concern is that China’s
subsidies will permit it to supplant the United States as the world’s primary 
supplier of high-tech goods.171 Although the United States could have brought
these complaints to the WTO, it instead chose to institute unilateral sanctions 
against China.172  In response China filed a complaint with the WTO.173 
On July 16, 2019, the WTO ruled that the U.S. sanctions on China with
respect to subsidized goods were not compliant with WTO anti-subsidy 
rules.174  Although the United States has tried to spin this as a win, the
167. See Keith Bradsher & Ana Swanson, U.S.-China Trade Talks Stumble on 
Beijing’s Spending at Home, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/12/business/china-trump-trade-subsidies.html [https://perma.cc/4BRP-7HTQ].
168. Kimberly Amadeo, Can Trump Bring Back American Jobs?, BALANCE (June
25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/trump-and-jobs-4114173 [https://perma.cc/BW7C-
E9RB].
169. See Mark J. Perry, China’s Subsidies Are Unfair and Harm Americans, Right?, 
AM. ENTERPRISE INST.: CARPE DIEM (Feb. 20, 2019), http://www.aei.org/publication/ 
chinas-subsidies-are-unfair-and-harm-americans-right/ [https://perma.cc/J4BU-ZW7J]. 
170. Kenneth Rapoza, U.S. Companies: China Unfair, but We Don’t Really Care, 
FORBES (Aug. 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/08/30/ 
us-companies-china-unfair-but-we-dont-really-care/#a2ed0654adf9 [https://perma.cc/F493-
8HU5].
171. See Michael Martina & David Lawder, Exclusive: China Offers To End Market-




172. Zeeshan Aleem, Why Trump’s Plan To Ignore the World Trade Organization Isn’t 
as Reckless as It Sounds, VOX (Mar. 8, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/3/8/14766228/trump-trade-wto [https://perma.cc/55UE-RP39]. 
173. See Ana Swanson, W.T.O. Allows China to Impose Trade Sanctions on U.S. 
Goods, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/business/wto-
china-us-trade.html [https://perma.cc/838H-BZZQ].
174. See id.; Paul Wiseman, Trump Administration Blasts WTO Ruling on China, 
SEATTLE TIMES (July 16, 2019, 12:34 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/trump-
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WTO does make clear that it considers the U.S. sanctions as violative of 
international law.175  
c. Direct Foreign Investment by China in U.S. Tech Companies 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a common way for corporations to 
“acquire new products and technologies.”176  The MIC2025 plan utilizes 
outbound FDI in companies located in the United States.177  The Rhodium
Group, a private advisory firm, estimates China’s investment in the United 
States at around $140 billion and U.S. investment in China at $256 
billion.178  It is not just China that acquires new technology through 
FDI; companies all over the world, including U.S. companies, acquire 
technology directly or indirectly through FDI.179  In fact, the United States, 
not China, is the world’s largest foreign direct investor in the world.180 
However, concerns over Chinese investment in tech companies led to
the enactment of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization 
Act, which expands the types of investments by foreign entities in U.S.
companies that the U.S. government must preapprove.181  According to 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, FDI into the United States has 
resulted in 7.4 million jobs in the United States with an average salary of 
administration-blasts-wto-ruling-on-china/ [https://perma.cc/9R5T-2E68]. See generally
Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products 
from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/RW (adopted July 16, 2019). 
175. Don Weiland, WTO Rules Against US in Tariff Dispute with China, FIN. TIMES
(July 16, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/131a55ea-a84a-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04 
[https://perma.cc/BVT2-5MB5]. Rather than comply with the WTO ruling, the current 
U.S. administration threatened to apply additional sanctions. See id.
 176. Justin Kuepper, Foreign Direct Investment, BALANCE (June 25, 2019), https:// 
www.thebalance.com/what-is-foreign-direct-investment-1979197 [https://perma.cc/9L6X-
F5CU] (explaining both the benefits and risks of FDI). 
177. See James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to 
Global Trade?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: BACKGROUNDER (May 13, 2019), https://www. 
cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade [https://perma.cc/9ZH6-D2A5]
(“Chinese companies, both private and state-backed, have been encouraged to invest in foreign 
companies, notably semiconductor firms, to gain access to advanced technology.  The value of
Chinese acquisitions in the United States peaked in 2016 at over $45 billion.”). 
178. MORRISON, supra note 150, at 1–2. 
179. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2019:
Special Economic Zones, at 60–61, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2019 (June 12, 2019), https:// 
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8YR-ARWC]. 
180. Jonathan Masters & James McBride, Foreign Investment and U.S. National 
Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: BACKGROUNDER (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/ 
backgrounder/foreign-investment-and-us-national-security [https://perma.cc/C7UB-X8Y7].
181. See JAMES L. JACKSON & CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IF10952, CFIUS REFORM: FOREIGN INVESTMENT NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS 1 
(2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX6X-T2R9]; infra 
Section IV.B.2.c. 
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$81,000 from foreign-owned firms.182 Additionally, the prevention of
FDI by China in Silicon Valley will harm AI start-ups who rely on this 
money.183 
d. Cybersecurity
Because China is a major supplier of 5G hardware, concerns have been 
expressed about the ability of the Chinese government to conduct surveillance 
or potentially interrupt communications as a wartime strategy.184  In fact, 
both the United States and China fear espionage from the other,185 ignoring
the fact that espionage is already occurring186 and parts made in the United
States already are embedded in Chinese tech while Chinese parts are already 
embedded in U.S. tech.187  The accusations against China’s surveillance
state ignore widespread U.S. surveillance of both citizens at home and foreign 
actors abroad.188  In 2018, the U.S.’s National Security Agency targeted
164,770 foreign citizens with warrantless surveillance—permitted under 
182. Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), SELECTUSA, https://www.selectusa.
gov/FDI-Benefits [https://perma.cc/PYX2-9A3J].
183. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, China Is Flooding Silicon Valley with Cash. Here’s 




184. See David E. Sanger, Trump Wants to Wall Off Huawei, but the Digital World 
Bridles at Barriers, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/ 
us/politics/us-huawei-berlin-wall.html [https://perma.cc/4MLL-RZ24].
185. Gardels, supra note 58. 
186. See Ryan Duffy, Fighting Chinese Cyber-Espionage Could Cost U.S. 5G 
Dominance, CYBERSCOOP (July 30, 2018), https://www.cyberscoop.com/5g-network-huawei-
zte-us-telecom/ [https://perma.cc/YP89-Q67P]. “‘You might argue that the United 
States wrote the book on using a commercial presence in the internet backbone in other 
countries for espionage, but China will write the 5G chapter,’ said” “Will Carter, deputy 
director of the technology policy program at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), a D.C. think tank.”  Id. 
 187. See Chris Mills Rodrigo, China Orders Government Offices to Remove Foreign 
Hardware and Software, HILL (Dec. 9, 2019, 12:03 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/ 
473673-china-orders-government-offices-to-remove-foreign-hardware-and-software
[https://perma.cc/V88Z-ZDKE]; Kate Fazzini, Chinese Spy Chips Are Found in Hardware




188. See NSA Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/ 
privacy-and-surveillance/nsa-surveillance [https://perma.cc/T6FT-PJWA]. 
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Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.189  At a recent 
cybersecurity conference, Senator Ron Wyden indicated that U.S. 
telecommunications companies were, in fact, helping the U.S. government to 
spy on its own citizens.190  Additionally, all aspects of telecommunication 
networks contain security risks.191  While 5G creates new ones,192 security
measures are being developed to address these.193  Regardless of the equipment
provider, any network is subject to hacking.194 
While the legitimacy to the complaints made by the United States can 
be debated,195 what is a fact is that the current administration has chosen 
189. See Charlie Osborne, NSA Surveillance of Foreign Nationals Surges, ZDNET
(May 1, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/nsa-surveillance-of-foreign-nationals-
surges/ [https://perma.cc/F43A-8ZGJ]. On August 15, 2019, President Trump asked Congress 
to permanently authorize the NSA mass surveillance program exposed by Edward Snowden in 
2013. See Jake Johnson, Alarm as Trump Requests Permanent Reauthorization of NSA Mass 
Spying Program Exposed by Snowden, COMMON DREAMS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.
commondreams.org/news/2019/08/16/alarm-trump-requests-permanent-reauthorization-
nsa-mass-spying-program-exposed [https://perma.cc/NEZ3-GY3S].
190. Paul Wagenseil, US Senator Says Wireless Carriers Helping Trump Build 
‘Surveillance State’, TOM’S GUIDE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.tomsguide.com/news/us-
senator-says-wireless-carriers-helping-trump-build-surveillance-state [https://perma.cc/
88VK-PSEA].
191. See, e.g., Catalin Cimpanu, Researchers Find Security Flaws in 40 Kernel 
Drivers from 20 Vendors, ZDNET (Aug. 10, 2019, 10:45 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/ 
article/researchers-find-security-flaws-in-40-kernel-drivers-from-20-vendors/ [https://perma.cc/
53TZ-X57Z]. Security flaws can be found in hardware regardless of where it originated. 
See id. For example, at a cybersecurity conference in August 2019, design flaws were 
found in commonly used software made by a number of companies, including U.S. companies
such as Intel, AMD, and Nvidia, in addition to Huawei. Id.  When the security flaws were
revealed, Intel and Huawei immediately issued updates.  Id.
 192. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OVERVIEW OF RISKS INTRODUCED BY 5G ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019), 
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0731_cisa_5th-generation-mobile-
networks-overview_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRW7-X6ZJ].
193. See, e.g., SERDAR VURAL ET AL., DCMS PHASE 1 5G TESTBEDS & TRIALS 
PROGRAMME, 5G NETWORK ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY 2 (2018), https://uk5g.org/media/ 
uploads/resource_files/5G_Architecture_and_Security_technical_report_-_04Dec18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/64BB-HULJ].
194. See Eric Johnson, Every Telecom Company Can Be Hacked and “Everybody
Should Be Suspect,” Huawei USA’s Chief Security Officer Says, VOX (Aug. 27, 2019, 
3:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/27/20835463/huawei-andy-purdy-security-
cso-cybersecurity-trump-trade-china-kara-swisher-recode-decode-podcast [https://perma.cc/
2ELD-QZ5L] (“‘Back when Edward Snowden released information about the Prism program that 
was allowing the US government to spy all over the world, there was a situation where the 
US government was using Cisco equipment to spy elsewhere in the world,’ Purdy said.  
‘There was a question, well, did Cisco let them or did the US government hack into Cisco 
products?  It doesn’t matter.’”). 
195. For a detailed discussion on the legitimacy of the U.S. complaints against China, see 
Steve Charnovitz, Grading Trump’s China Trade Strategy 3 (George Washington Univ. 
Law Sch. Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 2019-26, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393083 
[https://perma.cc/HLG8-N3TU]. 
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to bypass the normal route of addressing trade disputes through the WTO.196 
By unilaterally taking action against China and disregarding international 
trade norms, the United States has backed itself into a corner and is losing 
the respect of the rest of the world.197  The following are a brief summary
of the various actions the U.S. government has taken against China and China’s 
responses. 
2. Trade War Instigation
a. Tariffs
In 2017 at President Trump’s urging, the United State Trade Representative
began an investigation into China’s trade practices under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974.198  On March 22, 2018, President Trump released 
a memo alleging that China had violated Section 301 with forced 
technology transfers, theft of U.S. intellectual property, discriminatory 
practices, and foreign direct investment, which justified the imposition of 
a 25% tariff on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.199  The  
United States then imposed four additional rounds of tariffs in 2018 and 
2019 on approximately $360 billion of Chinese goods.200 China responded 
196. See Brewster, supra note 69, at 6.
197. See John Gramlich & Kat Devlin, More People Around the World See U.S.
Power and Influence as a ‘Major Threat’ to Their Country, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACT 
TANK (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/14/more-people-
around-the-world-see-u-s-power-and-influence-as-a-major-threat-to-their-country/ [https://
perma.cc/2V46-T8NS].  Between 2013 and 2018, the world’s confidence in the U.S. President 
fell from 70% to 28%. Id. Additionally, while the United States keeps raising tariffs, the 
rest of the world is reducing them, forming new free trade partnerships, with China reducing 
tariffs to other countries.  Veronique De Rugy, Trump Is Losing His Own Trade War, 
REASON (July 4, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://reason.com/2019/07/04/trump-is-losing-his-
own-trade-war/ [https://perma.cc/RT4H-2BP4]. 
198. KAREN M. SUTTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11284, U.S.-CHINA TRADE AND 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS:OVERVIEW 1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11284.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LTU7-YA79].
199. Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China’s 
Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and 
Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099, 13,099 (Mar. 22, 2018); Jacob Pramuk, Trump to Slap 
25% Tariffs on Up to $50 Billon of Chinese Goods; China Retaliates, CNBC (June 15, 
2018, 8:05 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/15/trump-administration-to-slap-a-25-
percent-tariff-on-50-billion-of-chinese-goods-threatens-more.html [https://perma.cc/NP3H-
XKFZ].
200. A Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45899310 [https://perma.cc/NV2R-M7LF]. 
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with tariffs on $110 billion of American goods.201  The tit for tat continued 
with China responding in kind to each round of tariffs set by the United 
States.202  China also initiated WTO action against the United States on 
August 14, 2018, alleging violations of WTO Agreements,203 a second action 
on August 23, 2018 after trade talks stalled yet again regarding the United 
States’ new round of Section 301 tariffs,204 and a third one on September 
1, 2019 regarding the set of tariffs that became effective that day.205 
Interestingly, the United States responded to all three of these actions by 
stating that they were exempt from WTO rules because the tariffs were
“necessary to protect public morals,” which is typically asserted with respect 
to trade restrictions on gambling and animal rights.206 
President Trump decided not to meet with President Xi in February 
2019,207 although representatives of the countries continued to meet from 
February 2019 through July 2019.208  Despite announcing progress at the
July 30–31, 2019 trade negotiation talks between Trump and Xi, on 
August 1, 2019, Trump moved forward with the final round of tariffs that 
would affect virtually all Chinese goods.209  After China threatened to take
201. Id. 
202. See id.
 203. Joe McDonald, China Files WTO Challenge to US Tariffs on Solar Panels, AP
News (Aug. 14, 2018), https://apnews.com/385dfd35eb3f41068a73a81a2ad2219a/China-
files-WTO-challenge-to-US-tariffs-on-solar-panels [https://perma.cc/GB3Z-SC26].
204. Chad P. Bown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date 
Guide, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Dec. 13, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.piie.com/
blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide [https://perma.cc/
3AUF-XH76].
205. Meg Shen & Tom Miles, China Lodges Tariff Case at WTO Against the U.S., 




207.  Alan Rappeport, Trump Will Not Meet President Xi Jinping of China Before 
Trade Deal Deadline, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/us/
politics/trump-xi-jinping-china-trade.html [https://perma.cc/3U2A-FF9K].  Trump and Xi 
did eventually meet on June 29, 2019 at the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan.  Ryan Hass, 
What the US and China Each Got Out of the Trump-Xi Meeting in Japan, BROOKINGS: 
ORDER FROM CHAOS (July 1, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/ 
2019/07/01/what-the-us-and-china-each-got-out-of-the-trump-xi-meeting-in-japan/ [https://
perma.cc/2YDB-YG3L]. 
208. See Dorcus Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US-China Trade War: A 
Timeline, CHINA BRIEFING (May 13, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-
china-trade-war-a-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/K368-JYCG]. 
209. See Yun Li, Trump Says US Will Impose 10% Tariffs on Another $300 Billion 
of Chinese Goods Starting Sept. 1, CNBC (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.cnbc. 
com/2019/08/01/trump-says-us-will-impose-10percent-tariffs-on-300-billion-of-chinese-
goods-starting-september-1.html [https://perma.cc/X627-P2YS]. On August 5, 2019, the 
United States also initiated an action with the International Monetary Fund against China 
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“necessary countermeasures” if President Trump enacted the proposed
tariffs on September 1, 2019, Trump agreed to delay some of them until 
mid-December 2019.210  President Trump has repeatedly stated that he believes
tariffs will reduce the deficit211 and create jobs.212 
b. Executive Orders
On May 15, 2019, Trump issued an emergency executive order effectively 
banning U.S. companies from using Chinese telecom equipment.213  The
claiming that it is a currency manipulator. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Treasury Designates China as a Currency Manipulator (Aug. 5, 2019), https://home.treasury. 
gov/news/press-releases/sm751 [https://perma.cc/KT6G-FV68].
210. Taylor Telford & Thomas Heath, China Promises ‘Countermeasures’ in Trade 
War, Unmoved by U.S. Tariff Delay, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2019, 3:27 PM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/15/china-promises-countermeasures-trade-war-
unmoved-by-us-tariff-delay/ [https://perma.cc/7RGB-88NG]. The United States has also
refused to appoint new judges to the WTO Appellate Body leaving it unable to resolve 
disputes under the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Charnovitz, 
supra note 195, at 3.  For a detailed account of all actions taken by the U.S. administration 
against China as a part of this trade war, see Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 153, at 
129–42. 
211. See, e.g., Ana Swanson, Trump Vowed to Shrink the Trade Gap. It Keeps Growing.,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/us/politics/us-trade-
deficit.html [https://perma.cc/C8QN-GAPR]. Contrary to his assertion, the trade war has 
actually increased the deficit because of reduced exports to China.  Katia Dmitrieva, U.S. 
Trade Gap Surged to $621 Billion in 2018, 10-Year High, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2019, 
5:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-06/u-s-trade-gap-surged-
to-621-billion-in-2018-highest-in-decade [https://perma.cc/3QSH-F3JV]; see also Frank
Tang, US-China Trade War Will Not Reduce Trade Deficit, IMF Finds, in Rebuke of 
Donald Trump’s Tariff Policies, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 3, 2019, 10:15 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3004532/us-china-trade-war-will-
not-reduce-trade-deficit-imf-finds [https://perma.cc/3A6R-7TPD] (discussing the IMF’s 
report indicating that tariffs will not reduce a country’s trade deficit). 
212. Amadeo, supra note 168.  Unfortunately, U.S. companies that are being forced
out of China by U.S. tariffs are not relocating to the United States, but rather are expending 
funds to build new plants in other areas of the world where labor costs are low, such 
as Taiwan and Thailand.  Debby Wu, Trump Trade War Is Splitting Tech Manufacturers Along 
U.S.-China Lines, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/
technology/story/2019-08-15/trump-trade-war-has-tech-manufacturers-splitting-along-us- 
china-lines [https://perma.cc/23KK-FRCQ].
213. See Tamer A. Soliman, U.S. Commerce Department Proposes Sweeping New
Rules for National Security Review of US Information and Communications Technology 



























    
      
 
  
    
  
order may act as a de facto ban on the trade of communications technology
between the United States and China.214 On May 16, 2019, the U.S.
Department of Commerce placed Huawei on its banned “entity list.”215 
This action poses a serious threat to the U.S. economy as Huawei bought
over $11 billion in equipment and services from U.S. companies last year 
alone.216  The stated reasons for its placement on the entity list is that the
use of Chinese equipment could result in China spying on the United 
States and that by allowing U.S. companies to sell components to China, 
they are effectively transferring U.S.-made technology to the Chinese 
government.217  Among other harms, this order will damage small and rural
U.S. wireless carriers as they rely on Chinese equipment due to its favorable 
price point.218  The order requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish 
guidelines for implementation, but it is uncertain if the federal government 
will provide adequate assistance to these small and rural carriers to replace 
their equipment.219 
China responded by issuing a white paper on June 2, 2019, denouncing 
the “unilateral and protectionist measures” and the United States’ failure 
to honor agreements made during the trade discussions.220  In what appears 
chain [https://perma.cc/E5SD-N4UW] (discussing the effect of the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s proposed rule in response to Trump’s executive order). 
214. See Fung, supra note 20. 
215. Wong & Koty, supra note 208. In anticipation of the executive order, Huawei 
has been stockpiling needed components and working on developing its own operation 
system if it is no longer able to purchase components from Microsoft and Google.  
Naushad K. Cherrayil, Trump’s Huawei Ban a ‘Double-Edged Sword’, TECHRADAR (May
20, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/news/trumps-huawei-ban-a-double-edged-sword
[https://perma.cc/377R-K9SY].
216. Louise Lucas, James Kynge & Sue-Lin Wong, Huawei Warns Ban Set to Hurt 
1,200 US Suppliers, FIN. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/84603f22-
81d9-11e9-9935-ad75bb96c849 [https://perma.cc/S3FA-XJX4].
217. See Fung, supra note 20. 
218. See id.  “The Rural Wireless Association, a trade group that represents 55 small 
carriers, estimates that it would cost its members $800 million to $1 billion to replace 
equipment from Huawei and ZTE, China’s other maker of networking gear.”  Cecilia Kang, 
Huawei Ban Threatens Wireless Service in Rural Areas, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/technology/huawei-rural-wireless-service.html [https://
perma.cc/VL48-NJ79].  A number of these rural telecoms chose Huawei because of their
ability to customize their equipment and “charge 20 to 30 percent less than competitors.” Id. 
This presents the additional harm of allowing the larger carriers—who do not rely on
Huawei—to further increase their market share to the disadvantage of these small carriers 
and consumers. Id.
 219. See Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15. 2019) (noting nothing 
about whether the government will provide assistance to small carriers); see also Fung, 
supra note 20; infra Section IV.C.1 (describing the trade wars’ harms to rural communities 
and small carriers). 
220. China Publishes White Paper on Trade Consultations, Revealing US Backtracking, 
XINHUANET (June 2, 2019, 6:01 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/02/c_ 
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to be a response to U.S. tech companies explaining to Trump the damage
the ban is having on their companies and the economy as a whole, Trump
agreed to exempt 110 products from tariffs for one year.221  Additionally,
the Secretary of Commerce indicated that licenses would be issued to 
companies selling to Huawei where there was no security threat.222 
c. Regulations
In addition to the tariffs and executive order, the new 2018 Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)223 has vastly
restricted Chinese investment in U.S. AI companies.  Although the Act does 
not call out China specifically, it addresses concerns raised by the 
administration regarding foreign direct investment in U.S. tech companies 
and updates the 2007 law.224  Scholars have commented that rather than
protecting U.S. interests, the FIRRMA may actually harm the development 
of AI in the United States by decreasing funding available for such projects 
and causing AI research centers to relocate outside of the United States.225 
The Chinese have strategically pursued investment in tech companies to
gain access to advanced AI technology.226 This provides advantages to both 
the United States and China.227  These U.S. companies receive start-up capital 
and China receives access to new technologies that are not yet available 
138111006.htm [https://perma.cc/UZ7W-PGGQ].  To find China’s position on the China-
US Economic and Trade Consultations, see STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA, CHINA’S POSITION ON THE CHINA-US ECONOMIC AND TRADE CONSULTATIONS 
(2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/02/c_138110404.htm [https://perma.cc/
3FF5-JT5Z]. 
221.  Wong & Koty, supra note 208. 
222. Id. 
223. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-
232, §§ 1701–28, 132 Stat. 2174 (2018). 
224. JACKSON & CIMINO-ISAACS, supra note 181, at 1.
 225. Justin Shields, Smart Machines and Smarter Policy: Foreign Investment Regulation, 
National Security, and Technology Transfer in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 51 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 299–300 (2018).  As a result of new U.S. restrictions, China may 
choose to focus on partnerships and investments with European entities.  Id. at 300. 
226. See id. at 286 (noting that Chinese tech giants, such as Tencent and Baidu, as 
well as Chinese venture capitalist firms, have heavily invested in Silicon Valley). 
227. China invested $3 billion in Silicon Valley start-ups in 2018 before FIRRMA 
went into effect; that money has now dried up.  See Heather Somerville, Chinese Tech 






















   
  




   
 
    
  
in their country.228  In addition to slowing down start-up funding for AI 
in the United States, another concern is that because the U.S. government 
does not invest in the development of these technologies, it is primarily 
left to private industry.229  As a result, the Department of Defense obtains its
technology from the private sector as opposed to developing needed 
technology itself.230 
Another harm resulting from these new regulations is the impact on 
U.S.-China collaboration.  Twenty-five percent of U.S. graduate students 
in STEM fields are Chinese foreign nationals.231 China and the United States 
have a long history of cooperation in the development of tech,232 which is
now at risk. The technology transfers complained of by the United States 
are a result of the field’s very nature.233  Developments occur in both commercial 
and academic outlets with both American and Chinese participation.234  Just
as the Chinese government seeks to advance its economic and military 
228. See Edmund Amann & Swati Virmani, Foreign Direct Investment and Reverse 
Technology Spillovers: The Effect on Total Factor Productivity, 2014 OECD J. ECON. 
STUD. 129, 135 (2015). 
229. See Alaina J. Harkness et. al., The State of Tech Policy, One Year into the Trump 
Administration, BROOKINGS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2018/01/30/the-state-of-tech-policy-one-year-into-the-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TZ27-9Z99].  This failure of funding by the U.S. government is another example of a
failure of tech policy.  In addition to the lack of expert advisers on technology issues due 
to recent emptying of these high-level positions, Brookings experts noted how this lack of
tech knowledge in the federal government is a threat to national security and how the federal 
government is more intent on dismantling policy than creating it.  See id.
230. David R. Fitzgerald, Comment, Leaving the Back Door Open: How Export
Control Reform’s Deregulation May Harm America’s Security, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 
65, 69 (2014).  Although the U.S. military formerly led in technological innovation, the current 
reliance on private industry and open source AI is a threat to national security as these 
technological developments are available to governments outside of the United States for 
purchase or development.  See id. 
 231. See MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEF. INNOVATION UNIT EXPERIMENTAL,
CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY ENABLE A STRATEGIC COMPETITOR TO ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. 
INNOVATION 3 (2018), https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransfer 
study_jan_2018_(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/QRH5-PH7Z] (noting that 25% of graduate students
at U.S. universities are comprised of Chinese nationals in STEM fields).
232. See THOMAS FINGAR & BANNING GARETT, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, CHINA-US 
COOPERATION: KEY TO A GLOBAL FUTURE 1–5 (2013), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/China-US_Cooperation_Key_to_the_Global_Future_WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8NP-EXH7]. In 2013, both countries celebrated their relationship in a 
report issued by the China-US Joint Working Group on China-US cooperation.  See 
generally id.  For a discussion regarding collaboration due to globalization, see supra Part 
III. 
233. See Evan Zimmerman, Comment, The Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act: How CFIUS Became a Tech Office, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1267, 
1292–95 (2019).
234. See id. at 1292. 
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position, so does the United States.  The changes to CFIUS (the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States) made by FINSA (the Foreign
Investment & National Security Act of 2007) require a mandatory 
investigation when the foreign entity involved is state-owned, as many
Chinese entities are.235 
Because a lot of U.S. tech start-ups rely on Chinese investment, any
restriction on such investment will slow down these developments,
potentially impacting the U.S. economy.236  Additionally, such restrictions
will impact the flow of Chinese technical developments back into the 
United States.237  According to the U.S. National Science and Technology
Council, China leads the world in “deep learning” journal publications.238 
In response to FIRRMA, China has announced the creation of its own
“technological security management list”, which would allow China to
contain its technology within its borders and strengthen its current 
firewall.239 
d. H-1B Visa Restrictions
Another major concern for U.S. tech companies in particular is the
reduction of H-1B visas available for foreign workers.  As a part of the 
Buy American and Hire American Executive Order,240 the United States 
has dramatically reduced the ability of foreign workers to obtain permission 
to come to the United States.241  Due to these visa concerns, more Chinese
235. Shields, supra note 225, at 293. 
236. See id. at 297. “Start-up fundraising in Silicon Valley wouldn’t function without 
Chinese money.”  Dwoskin, supra note 183; see also Zimmerman, supra note 233, at 1302 
(“Also critical is [U.S.] government investment in core R&D, which has stagnated.  Though 
CFIUS’s professed aims relate to international investment, by potentially restricting capital 
inflows it also functions as a domestic policy in a suite of restrictions that further diminish 
American competitiveness.”  (citing J. JOHN WU, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., WHY 
U.S. BUSINESS R&D IS NOT AS STRONG AS IT APPEARS 4 (2018), http://www2.itif.org/ 
2018-us-business-rd.pdf?_ga=2.120341130.366752258.1590686982-74679620.1590686982 
[https://perma.cc/N474-858R])).
237. See Shields, supra note 225, at 299. 
238. See NSTC REPORT ON AI, supra note 22, at 13. 
239. China May Restrict Tech Access in Spiraling Trade War with US, CNBC (June 
9, 2019, 12:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/09/china-may-restrict-tech-access-
in-spiraling-trade-war-with-us.html [https://perma.cc/F45X-CU3B].
240.  Exec. Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18,837, 18,837 (Apr. 18, 2017). 
241. Eric Rosenbach & Aditi Kumar, To Win the AI Race, Open America’s Doors, 
HILL (Apr. 24, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/440280-to-win-
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students are choosing the UK, Canada, and Australia over the United States 
for their studies.242  This is hitting the tech industry harder than most because
companies such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google and Intel are among the 
top employers of approved H-1B applicants.243  The Nature Index, which
tracks affiliations on high-quality scientific papers, indicates that China
and the United States are top collaborators to one another,244 but experts
warn that restricting access to visas will actually harm the United States 
in scientific advancements.245  It is also likely that due to an AI talent shortage, 
U.S. tech companies may need to move their research labs abroad.246 
Overall, the United States has instituted a number of actions directed 
against China, to which China has retaliated, benefiting neither country.
In fact, the trade war is not just harming the United States and China but 
has the potential to impede AI advances around the world. 
C. Trade War Harms
[T]here is a significant risk that the current trade war between the US and China
represents the start of a wider backlash to globalisation that ultimately leads to
the disintegration of the liberal rules-based system that has governed the cross-
border flow of goods, capital and labour over the past 70 years.  It’s even possible
that this might lead to an eventual Balkanisation of the global economy, with US-, 
the-ai-race-open-americas-doors [https://perma.cc/3NXQ-C42F] (noting that petitions for 
H-1B visas fell 15% in 2018, the first decline in the past five years). 
242. Celia Chen, Trade War Turning Chinese Students Off the US, with Many Opting
for UK, Canada and Australia, Says Payments Firm, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May
28, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3011956/trade-war-turning-
chinese-students-us-many-opting-uk-canada-and [https://perma.cc/GE42-WY9N]. U.S. 
universities have also asked Congress to address the visa crisis due to its impact on the 
ability to obtain and retain scholars.  Adria Schwarber, Universities Disturbed by Visa 
Delays, AM. INST. PHYSICS (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.aip.org/fyi/2019/universities-
disturbed-visa-delays [https://perma.cc/8C2H-58UJ].
243. Andy J. Semotiuk, Recent Changes to the H1B Visa Program and What Is 
Coming in 2019, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2019, 9:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/ 
2019/01/02/recent-changes-to-the-h1b-visa-program-and-what-is-coming-in-2019/#789d 
4f1e4a81 [https://perma.cc/4X6K-D3QL].
244. See Connected World: Patterns of International Collaboration Captured by the 
Nature Index, NATURE INDEX, https://www.natureindex.com/country-outputs/collaboration-
graph [https://perma.cc/TF6D-XMXD].
245. U.S. Scientists, Policy Advisors Oppose Restrictions on Collaboration with
China, supra note 75.  “If Americans wish[ ] to retain their place at the pinnacle, they should 
avoid the temptations of nativism, and recall their history of diversity, and the benefits to 
innovation it has brought.”  James Liang, US-China Tech Race Could Be Decided by 
Population Management as Superpowers Battle for Talent, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(July 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3019 
262/us-china-tech-war-could-be-decided-population-management [https://perma.cc/397K-
G35U].
246.  Rosenbach & Kumar, supra note 241. 
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and China-led spheres of influence, each with separate payment systems, regulatory
standards and technological platforms.247 
There is much fallout from the trade war including the slow-down of
5G infrastructure installations, damage to the economy, and potential damage 
to democracy both due to AI use by authoritarian countries and the United 
States moving away from international agreement and procedures for
resolving disagreements.
1. 5G 
As indicated above, Huawei is the top supplier of 5G network equipment
in the world.248  The U.S. government’s war on Huawei is slowing down
the installation of 5G technology both in the United States and the EU.249 
The 5G infrastructure is needed for AI because of its speed and low latency.250 
Because of the ban on Chinese-made components for the installation of 
the 5G network in the United States, carriers who have committed to 
building out this infrastructure are in a quandary over where they will get
the equipment and how much more it will cost.251  China and the EU dominate
with two-thirds of the market.252  According to the Pentagon’s advisory
board, not only is the Chinese equipment much less expensive than that 
247. Neil Shearing, The End of the World as We Know It?, CAP. ECON.: CHIEF 
ECONOMIST’S NOTE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/the-end-of-
the-world-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/32GM-GM8Z].
248. See Charlie Campbell, Inside the Controversial Company Helping China 
Control the Future of the Internet, TIME (May 23, 2019), https://time.com/5594366/5g-
internet-race-huawei/ [https://perma.cc/Y4BE-5J7V]. 
Huawei . . . has spent $2 billion over 10 years to ensure it is in the best position 
to be the architect of global 5G technology.  The company has already signed
contracts to provide 5G equipment with 40 international carriers and shipped
over 70,000 5G base stations, or short-range transceivers. 
Id.
 249. See Thomas Duesterberg, Problems and Prospects for 5G Deployment in the 
United States, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomas 
duesterberg/2019/04/30/problems-and-prospects-for-5g-deployment-in-the-united-states/#3 
af5b10e312e [https://perma.cc/3C8H-PSB6].
250. William Lehr, Future of Broadband Competition in a 5G World 6 (Aug. 15, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3240191 
[https://perma.cc/8YCE-GNZ8].
251. See Jeremy Hsu, How the U.S. Can Prepare to Live in China’s 5G World, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Apr. 23, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/standards/
how-america-can-prepare-to-live-in-chinas-5g-world [https://perma.cc/ADA5-7UWD].
252. See Fung, supra note 20. 
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which can be obtained from Europe, it is also reported to be of superior 
quality and functionality.253 Additionally, equipment sourced from Europe
cannot be installed on top of Chinese equipment due to a lack of 
interoperability.254  Nokia and Ericsson have both indicated an inability to 
meet Huawei’s pricing.255  This is of special concern to the rural areas of 
the United States where there is less incentive to upgrade telecommunications 
from 4G to 5G because of the enormous costs without the accompanying 
benefit.256  The cost to upgrade to European base stations in U.S. rural 
areas is estimated to be up to $1 billion.257  This means that “basic 
communications could disappear from poorly served communities.”258  In
addition, it is unclear if rural telecom providers in the United States will 
need to rip out Chinese-made equipment that is currently installed.259 
There is no U.S.-based company that can provide the necessary equipment
for widespread 5G small cell and base station installations.260 
Again, China is not unscathed by the trade war. Although China is ahead
by eighteen months in the rollout of 5G by some estimates261 and five years 
by others,262 China is impacted because of the trade war’s prohibition of 
sales by U.S. chip manufacturers to Chinese companies.263  Although China’s 
AIDP acknowledged the need to develop its semiconductor industry in 
order to reduce reliance on U.S.-made chips, reports disagree on whether 
their locally sourced chips are sufficient for the advanced processing 
253. See Hsu, supra note 251. 
254. See Duesterberg, supra note 249. 
255. Tarmo Virki & Angela Moon, Exclusive: In Push to Replace Huawei, Rural






 258. Id. (noting that the lack of return on investment for the installation of a 5G
infrastructure may delay or prevent upgrades outside densely populated urban areas). 
259. See id.
 260. See Fung, supra note 20.  Former U.S.-based Lucent was merged with France’s
Alcatel and later bought out by Finland’s Nokia.  Zen Soo, How US Went from Telecoms 
Leader to 5G Also-Ran Without Challenger to China’s Huawei, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Apr. 2, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/3004325/ 
how-us-went-telecoms-leader-5g-also-ran-without-challenger-chinas [https://perma.cc/
HAF3-4372]. In 2010, Nokia purchased U.S.-based Motorola leaving no major U.S. 
supplier of telecommunication hardware.  See id. 
 261. Campbell, supra note 248. 
262. See Hsu, supra note 251. 
263. Victoria Song, Chinese Chipmakers Say It’s Not Possible to Hit Goals Imposed 
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needs of AI.264 It does seem that with their stockpiling and sourcing from
Taiwan and Korea, they will be able to meet their chip needs, at least in 
the near future, for the installation of their 5G infrastructure.265 
2. Economy 
The current U.S. trade policy is a complete abdication of the past role 
America played in globalization and economic security.266  By moving
towards protectionism, and rejecting the norms associated with international 
trade, the United States is ignoring international law and abandoning its 
role since the end of WWII in promoting globalization and engaging in a 
multilateral system of trading and investment.267  This new policy singles
out China but impacts the global economy due to its tariff impacting the EU, 
Canada, and Mexico, among others, and the seeming randomness of 
actions initiated by the current administration.268  Predictability and 
consistency are important to the global economy.269 World economic experts 
agree that due to the trade war between the United States and China, among 
264. See Iris Deng, Building China’s Own Chip Industry Will Be a Costly 10-Year 
Marathon, Former Intel China MD Says, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 29, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/3012140/building-chinas-
own-chip-industry-will-be-costly-10-year [https://perma.cc/B5GP-EB59] (explaining that 
reports indicate that it will take China ten years to catch up with semiconductor technology,
which it previously sourced from the United States). 
265. See Brad Setser, Did Huawei’s Chip Stockpiling Bring China’s 2018 Trade 
Surplus Down?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 12, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/did-
huaweis-chip-stockpiling-bring-chinas-2018-trade-surplus-down [perma.cc/PF8T-ZNJX].
266. Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 153, at 116–17, 128 (“Upon taking office, in
his inaugural address, January 20, 2017, President Trump made clear his intention to shift 
American policy toward international trade.  He announced a new ‘America First’ trade 
policy as follows: ‘We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our 
products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs.  Protection will lead to great 
prosperity and strength.’” (quoting President Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address (Jan. 
20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/ [https://
perma.cc/59ZT-EE8V])). 
267. Id. at 117. 
268. See Elaina Plott, Trump’s Two Crutches, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2019), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/trump-tariffs-mexico/590950/ [https://perma.cc/
3AC4-6U5B].
269. See Sasha Vakulina, Uncertainty and Trade Tensions Slow Down the Global 
Economy, EURONEWS (June 13, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/uncertainty-
and-trade-tensions-slow-down-the-global-economy [https://perma.cc/LCB4-4M9Z]. 
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other factors, economic growth in the world economy will decrease.270 
Although the stated reasons for the institution of tariffs was to protect
national security and improve the balance of trade, neither has been 
accomplished, and in fact, national security is at greater risk now more
than ever,271 and the deficit may only get worse.272 
With respect to the tariffs instituted due to the trade war, rather than
improving the trade deficit, goods exports from the United States to China 
declined by $22 billion from 2017 to 2019.273  Because of the Trump 
Administration’s ban on sales to Huawei and requirement of government 
approval to sell to companies in China, the U.S. computer chip industry is 
being hit especially hard.274  Intel, Qualcomm, and AMD have all indicated 
that the U.S. imposed restrictions are harming their sales figures.275  Although
these companies have urged the White House to resolve its issues with 
China, it has instead indicated a desire to impose additional tariffs on 
Chinese goods.276 Although the tariffs impacting laptops and smartphones 
have been temporarily stalled, the uncertainty in the field is “creat[ing] anxiety 
across our customer supply chains” as indicated by Intel’s CEO and U.S. 
tech companies’ stock prices.277  The five largest tech companies in the 
United States, Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Alphabet, lost 
a combined $162 billion in market value as a result of the continuing trade 
270. Predictions for the Global Economy in 2019 from 13 Experts, FOCUSECON. (Jan.
17, 2019), https://www.focus-economics.com/blog/global-economy-predictions-2019-13-
experts [https://perma.cc/J58X-S7ME].
271. See Ali Wyne, The Security Risks of a Trade War with China, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-08-06/security-risks-
trade-war-china [https://perma.cc/VJZ6-8QC5] (“Up until recently, the two nations’ 
economic ties had served as an effective brake on escalating strategic distrust.  A China 
less constrained by and invested in economic ties with the United States could pose a 
substantially greater challenge to U.S. foreign policy.  For all the Trump Administration’s 
frustrations with managing interdependence, the consequences of decoupling could mean 
even bigger headaches.”). 
272. Desmond Lachman, Make America’s Deficits Great Again, HILL (July 9, 2019, 
3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/452045-make-americas-deficits-great-again 
[https://perma.cc/R38U-TVZW].
273. Paulo Santos, The U.S. Is Most Affected by the Trade War, SEEKING ALPHA
(July 14, 2019, 10:03 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4274868-u-s-affected-trade-
war [https://perma.cc/UD7X-TX6J]; US-China Bus. Council, 2020 State Export Report 2 
(2020), https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/2020_state_export_report_full_report_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JD4A-VQD3].
274. See Clare Duffy, The Trade War with China Is Coming for the American 
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war between the United States and China.278  It has been reported that the
Huawei ban has caused “extensive layoffs” in the United States by 
Huawei.279 
Although China’s decline in exports to the United States is
significantly less severe than U.S. exports to China, China is also feeling 
the effect of the trade war.280 As such, China is seeking to expand into 
other markets to replace its loss of exports to the United States.281  China’s
exports to other countries during the first half of 2019, however, only 
increased 2.1%.282  Because of the potential reduction in the U.S. market,
China has initiated discussion with Japan and South Korea, both U.S. 
allies, in creating a free-trade zone across the Asia-Pacific region.283 
The current U.S. administration’s confusing and reactionary trade
policy has not only left many in the tech field scratching their heads, but 
278. Jonathan Shieber, Tech Stocks Walloped as China Retaliates in the Latest Salvo 
of Its Trade War with the US, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 5, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://techcrunch. 
com/2019/08/05/tech-stocks-walloped-as-china-retaliates-in-the-latest-salvo-of-its-trade-
war-with-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/X8GC-E9QL].  On July 22, 2019, representatives
from the major U.S. tech companies, Intel, Qualcomm, Google, Microsoft, Broadcom, and 
Micron, met with the Trump Administration on the confusion regarding their ability to sell 
components in China.  Michael Grothaus, Tech Companies Will Meet at the White House 
Today to Discuss Huawei Ban, FASTCOMPANY (July 22, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
90379730/tech-companies-will-meet-at-the-white-house-today-to-discuss-huawei-ban
[https://perma.cc/UVJ6-4UYL].
279. Zak Doffman, Huawei Blacklisting Is Forcing ‘Extensive Layoffs’ In U.S.: Report, 
FORBES (July 14, 2019, 2:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/14/ 
huawei-blacklisting-now-forcing-extensive-layoffs-in-u-s-reports/#447b594667e9 [perma.cc/
X9VD-LPNA]. 
280. See Keith Bradsher, China’s Economic Growth Slows as Challenges Mount, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/china-economic- 
growth.html [https://perma.cc/P3RE-64U4].
281. See Qian Chen, Once Ambitious to Expand into the US, Some Chinese Firms 
Are Now Scaling Back, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/25/
chinese-firms-seek-expansion-to-middle-east-europe-asia-amid-trade-war.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3UVZ-R6LZ].  Although the BRI will vastly increase the market for the sale of 
Chinese goods, it is still in the infrastructure rollout stage and will take years for the
emerging markets to fully develop. See Chris Devonshire-Ellis, The Emerging Markets in 
China’s Belt & Road Initiative, SILK ROAD BRIEFING (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www. 
silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/08/30/emerging-markets-chinas-belt-road-initiative/ [https:// 
perma.cc/CWM4-UPMS].  That said, it does appear that the BRI worth in bilateral trade 
currently falls between $500 billion and $1.4 trillion.  See id. 
 282. Keith Brasher, China Needs New Places to Sell Its Mountain of Stuff, N.Y. 


















     
   
  
 
   





   
  
economists as well.284  In terms of economic loss to the United States,
leading economists have reported that consumers have paid the entire 
$68.8 billion in President Trump’s tariffs.285  The inverted yield curve in
the bond market has been noted as a warning sign of a coming recession.286 
Additionally, the trade war is causing currency devaluations, and if left 
unchecked, could result in additional protectionist measures around the
world and further harm to global economic growth.287 What scholars do 
agree upon is that even if the trade war is halted, which is unlikely, the 
damage done is very well permanent.288 
284. Many tech companies have indicated confusion as to which companies are on
the export ban list and which products are included.  Duffy, supra note 274. Although
Intel and Micron have both indicated that they have resumed shipments to Chinese firms 
on the banned entity list, others have not.  Id.  Some in the administration specifically 
blame the trade war on the tanking stock market in the United States.  Bess Levin, 
Everyone in the White House Thinks Trump’s Trade War Sucks, VANITY FAIR: HIVE (Aug.
15, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/08/donald-trump-trade-war-white-house-
detractors [https://perma.cc/Q3RJ-ETKT] (quoting Kayla Tausche & Jeff Cox, Trump,
Navarro Are the Only Officials in the White House Blaming the Fed for Volatility, Sources 
Say, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2019, 10:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/15/trump-navarro-
only-white-house-officials-blaming-volatility-on-fed.html [https://perma.cc/5J6W-B5FG]).
285. Michael Hiltzik, Column: Trump’s Trade War Is Politically Motivated,
yet Hurts Consumers and GOP Voters, Study Shows, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019, 12:35 
PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-trump-trade-war-20190304-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6CEZ-ZPJV] (“The authors, Pablo D. Fajgelbaum of UCLA,
Pinelopi K. Goldberg of Yale and the World Bank (where she is chief economist), Patrick 
J. Kennedy of UC Berkeley and Amit K. Khandelwal of Columbia, [of the study] pegged
the annual economic loss from Trump’s tariffs at $68.8 billion, or about 0.37% of gross
domestic product, chiefly because of higher-cost imports.  Gains to some domestic producers
who benefited from protective tariffs cut the overall loss to $6.4 billion, or .03% of GDP.”). 
286. Neil Irwin, Global Economic Trouble Is Brewing, and the Trade War Is Only
Part of It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/upshot/ 
global-economic-trouble-is-brewing-and-the-trade-war-is-only-part-of-it.html [perma.cc/
BZL5-3N6C] (“The world is ambling toward an economic morass of the sort that no mere 
presidential tweet can fix.”).  The Dow dropped 900 points on August 5, 2019, ostensibly 
due to President Trump’s threat of new tariffs.  Shieber, supra note 278. 
287. See id.
288. Efraim Berkovich, Marshall W. Meyer & Mary E. Lovely, What Are the Long-
term Costs of the China-U.S. Trade War?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/u-s-china-tariffs/ [https://perma.cc/XUW9-
YB9A] (“‘U.S. companies will also see their global competitiveness eroding with the tariff 
war.  ‘The rest of the world will continue to enjoy lower-priced inputs, and our companies 
are going to have to compete with them,’ said Mary E. Lovely, professor of economics at 
Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; she is also a senior
fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Affairs.  ‘That really ties one of their hands 
behind their back.  This is doing permanent damage to the U.S. economy.’”).
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3. Democracy
In addition to slowing down the installation of 5G infrastructure, reducing 
trade, and harming the global economy, the trade war also has the potential 
to destabilize democracy worldwide.289  The tariffs imposed by the United 
States undermine the law of the World Trade Organization.290  At the G20 
Summit in Osaka in June 2019, leaders from the EU decried the damage 
to the global economy that the U.S.-China trade war is causing.291 By
engaging in unilateral acts rather than using international dispute resolution 
289. See Charnovitz, supra note 78 at 226–28 (“The Trump Administration is
carrying out a new form of American rejectionism powered by four horsemen of economic 
instability: first, the rejection of the international rule of law; second, the rejection of open 
markets; third, the rejection of economic peace in favour of perpetual economic war; and 
fourth, the rejection of the global interest.  The analysis herein shows how these four 
rejectionist policies are harming the United States, other countries, and the global order.”). 
290. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The 2018 American and Chinese Trade Wars Risk 
Undermining the World Trading System and Constitutional Democracies 1–4 (European 
Univ. Inst. Dep’t of Law, Working Paper No. LAW 2018/17, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract= 3275188 [perma.cc/GD8S-8RYW]. 
As tariffs tax and restrict domestic citizens and redistribute their income, illegal 
import tariffs (e.g. as imposed by US President Trump) – and the collective
undermining of the WTO Appellate Body and dispute settlement system – also
run counter to the democratic mandates given by parliaments when they
approved the 1994 WTO Agreement and incorporated it into domestic legal
systems, as illustrated by trade laws and policies in the USA (section II) and in
the European Union (EU, section III).  Multilevel governance of global public 
goods (PGs) – like the WTO trading system, which has helped to lift billions of 
people out of poverty by promoting unprecedented economic welfare, transnational 
rule of law and compulsory third-party dispute settlements – cannot remain 
effective if citizens and democratic institutions fail to hold their governments 
democratically and legally accountable for violating ‘PGs treaties’ (section IV).
This contribution uses the example of the USA and the EU for arguing that
constitutional democracies – including Asian democracies like India, Korea and
Japan – must adopt more specific trade legislation protecting the WTO legal system.
Multilevel governance of transnational PGs requires empowering citizens, 
parliaments and courts of justice to limit populist abuses of trade policy powers 
to tax and restrict citizens in manifestly illegal ways reducing general consumer
welfare, non-discriminatory competition and rule of law. 
Id. at Abstract. 
291. Kristin Huang, G20: Europe Tells US and China Their Trade War Is Harming 
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mechanisms, the entire democratic process is at risk.292 By blocking
appointments to the WTO Appellate Board, the United States demonstrates 
its lack of respect for international order, which could have far reaching 
effects.293  Without a fully-functioning Appellate Board, there is no method 
for international trade dispute resolution that affects all members.294 
There is also a concern that if the Chinese model of AI becomes the de
facto model, it could lead to adoption of mass surveillance and control by 
authoritarian regimes.295 
V. THE FUTURE OF AI 
A. Innovation Winter 
We’re heading for a global innovation winter—a politically driven reduction in
the financial and human capital available to drive the next generation of emerging
technologies.296 
Contrary to conflicting reports on “who” is winning the AI race, the fact
is there is no winner, there is no leader, and the current state of affairs will 
slow down, potentially crippling, the development of this important field. 
In addition to the factors described earlier impacting AI, the trade war
between the United States and China has placed obstacles in its way which
could take years to remove.297  Smart cars, smart cities, smart homes, smart 
factories, and connected medical devices require the speed that 5G offers 
and the low latency that edge computing will provide.298  While varying 
rationales have been cited for this trade war, it does appear that the United 
States is trying to slow down China’s expansion into this field and impede 
292. See Geraldo Vidigal, Westphalia Strikes Back: The 2018 Trade Wars and the Threat
to the WTO Regime 27–32 (Amsterdam Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 
2018-31, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259127 [https://perma.cc/SJG7-Q9K9]. 
293. Id. at 2, 42–45. 
294. Id. at 2. 
295. Steven Feldstein, The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence 
Ixs Reshaping Repression, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2019, at 40, 41–46.  But see H. AKIN UNVER, 
CTR. FOR ECON. & FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTHORITARIANISM 
AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS 1, 16 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3331635 [https://perma.cc/65XN-5U3Q] (explaining how algorithms are 
increasingly shaping political decision-making, potentially subverting free will in both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes). 
296. Ian Bremmer & Cliff Kupchan, Risk 6: Innovation Winter, EURASIA GROUP (Jan. 
7, 2019), https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/risk-6-innovation-winter [https://perma.cc/
4RFE-MRCQ].
297. See Shields, supra note 225, at 297. 
298. See Lehr, supra note 250, at 4–8; see also Jeremy Horwitz, 5G’s Secret Weapon 
Will Be Low Latency, Empowering Next-Gen VR and Gaming, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 2, 
2018, 8:08 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2018/03/02/5gs-secret-weapon-will-be-low-latency-
empowering-next-gen-vr-and-gaming/ [https://perma.cc/8F8B-WK3X]. 
596
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its ability to provide 5G networking equipment to the rest of the world.299 
The U.S. government has repeatedly demonstrated its lack of understanding 
of technology300 and has moved away from funding R&D, leaving it to 
private industry to drive this field.301  For example, in 2017 Amazon
and Google spent $16.1 billion and $13.9 billion respectively on AI 
development whereas the total budgets for federal agencies in 2019
totaled just $5.3 billion.302  Although the United States was the clear leader 
in 4G technology, it does not have the current ability to lead in 5G.303 
Unfortunately, this technology is the key to practical application of AI.304 
Recognizing its failure, the United States has sought to slow down China’s 
expansion claiming unfair trade practices and potential espionage.305 
By putting Huawei, and other Chinese companies, on a trade blacklist and
encouraging the EU to do the same, the United States has done a great
299. See Reshma Kapadia, The U.S. and China’s Next Battle Won’t Be Won with Tariffs, 
BARRON’S (May 15, 2020, 7:05 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/5g-networks-have-
become-a-new-front-in-u-s-china-trade-war-51589583930 [https://perma.cc/V33U-UUP3].
China has already made US $180 billion in capital expenditures for 5G
deployment over the past five years, installing about 350,000 5G-operable base 
stations, which is nearly 10 times the number currently deployed in the United
States. . . .  This head start will also give China an early lead in developing and 
deploying smarter cities, self-driving cars, and automated factories, says the
Eurasia Group report.  The opportunity to test new applications and use cases 
could in turn attract business from other countries that are looking to supply their
own citizens with similar 5G-enabled applications and services.
Hsu, supra note 251. 
300. Nancy Scola, On Democrats’ Wish List: Tech Help for a Clueless Congress, 
POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2018, 7:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/29/democrats-
technology-congress-1074187 [https://perma.cc/AE8G-YFGK].
301. Walter Isaacson, How America Risks Losing Its Innovation Edge, TIME (Jan. 3, 
2019), https://time.com/longform/america-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/PES4-HP2S] (“In
the 1960s, around 70 percent of total R&D was federally funded, with 30 percent coming 
from the private sector.  Now those figures are reversed.”). 
302. See  YOAV SHOHAM ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INDEX: 2018 ANNUAL 
REPORT 58 (2018), http://cdn.aiindex.org/2018/AI%20Index%202018%20Annual%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/37PD-42ZE].
303. See Marguerite Reardon, How 5G Got Tied Up in a Trade War Between Trump 
and China, CNET (July 15, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-5g-got-
tied-up-in-a-trade-war-between-trump-and-china/?curator=MediaREDEF [https://perma.cc/
LB5Q-5KHB].
304. Ben Yu, The Convergence of 5G and AI: A Venture Capitalist’s View, VENTURE 
BEAT (Mar. 31, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/31/the-convergence-of-
5g-and-ai-a-venture-capitalists-view/ [https://perma.cc/G5AS-2HVV].
305. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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disservice to the world in terms of slowing down the potential social and
economic good that could result from advances in AI.306 
China, on the other hand, has placed enormous investment in both AI
and infrastructure, not just in China, but throughout the world.307  Although 
China and the United States enjoyed the benefits of their interdependence 
previously, by attempting to isolate China from the rest of the world, the 
United States will cause harm to all, especially to itself.308  It is critical at
this juncture that worldwide cooperation in the development of standards 
for both 5G technology and responsible AI be developed so that all companies 
and governments in all countries can participate.  Global interconnection 
is not only an important business goal, it also will drastically improve 
conditions for underdeveloped countries as it opens new markets and 
improves economic conditions there.309  However, the future of AI is now
at risk due to the split between the United States and China. 
B. Technological Bifurcation
The U.S. feud with Huawei risks bifurcating 5G’s rollout into two distinct
blocs–nations that embrace Chinese 5G and those that reject it wholesale– 
hampering global connectivity and hurting the bottom lines of companies forced
to choose. Technology consultant Stephanie Hare says the lack of trust between the
world’s No. 1 and No. 2 economies means every other country is being forced to
306. See Karla Lant, 7 Reasons You Should Embrace, Not Fear, Artificial Intelligence,
FUTURISM (Mar. 31, 2017), https://futurism.com/7-reasons-you-should-embrace-not-fear-
artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/6JD6-M7MA]. 
307. Reardon, supra note 303.
308. Scott Moore, The US Needs to Engage China on Tech—or Risk Isolating Itself,
WIRED (Dec. 19, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-the-us-needs-to-engage-
china-on-tech/ [https://perma.cc/W8HM-6FU2]  (“Scientific and technological progress 
are rarely the product of a single nation—witness this year’s Nobel Prizes, most of which 
were jointly awarded to researchers from multiple countries.  Like it or not, China is 
becoming a bigger player in the digital economy across the globe, thanks in part to export-
oriented strategies like the ‘digital Silk Road.’  If Washington continues down its current 
path of trying to build an alternative bloc, it is likely to confine itself, rather than China.”) 
309. Oliver Pickup, Instant Diagnosis by Smartphone: How Artificial Intelligence
Can Save Lives, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
business/tata-communications/artificial-intelligence-in-developing-countries/ [https:// 
perma.cc/X9G5-ARL6]. Africa appears to be in the throes of the beginning of a digital
revolution with emerging internationally recognized tech hubs.  Alex Liu, Africa’s Future
Is Innovation Rather than Industrialization, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 1, 2019), https:// 
www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/africa-innovation-rather-than-industrialization/ [https:// 
perma.cc/WYN6-842K].  As this market grows, China is in the position to benefit as it has 
advanced the 5G infrastructure there, permitting this digital revolution.  W. Gyude Moore, 
African Countries Should Stay Loyal to China’s Troubled Huawei—Regardless of Trump, 
QUARTZ AFRICA (May 27, 2019), https://qz.com/africa/1629078/africa-will-stay-loyal-to-
chinas-huawei-regardless-of-trump/ [https://perma.cc/U69H-F9YB]. 
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choose sides, based on its own interests.  “There can be no sitting on the fence 
here.”310 
The decoupling of the United States and China not only has the potential 
to create two separate 5G technologies and infrastructures, it increases the 
risk of two separate internets, two separate AI tracks, and two separate
systems of trade.311  If a country in the EU built out its telecommunication 
infrastructure as part of the Chinese BRI,312 U.S. made devices would not 
be compatible there locking residents of those countries into Chinese tech 
and out of U.S. tech.313  With Africa and South America signing on to the 
BRI, these markets could be closed off permanently to the United States314 
With respect to 5G, both Nokia and Ericsson in Europe have considered
setting up two separate units, one for the United States and one for China.315 
There is also some concern that the internet will be split into two—one
for China and one for the United States, again forcing all other countries 
to choose.316  Preventing China from accessing components and technology
in the United States could actually speed up China’s innovation resulting 
in “a bifurcation into a Chinese-led internet and a non-Chinese internet 
310. Campbell, supra note 248.
311. See Bown & Irwin, supra note 81 (“The Trump administration’s attacks on the
WTO and the expansive legal rationalizations it has given for many of its protectionist 
actions threaten to pull apart the unified global trading system.  And on China, it has 
become clear that the administration is bent on severing, not fixing, the relationship.  The 
separation of the world’s two largest economies would trigger a global realignment. Other 
countries would be forced to choose between rival trade blocs.”). 
312. In 2004, Huawei entered its first major contract with a European provider for
€230 million. Zen Soo & Li Tao, How Huawei Went from Small-Time Trader in Shenzhen 
to World’s Biggest Telecoms Equipment Supplier, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 18, 
2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/2186494/how-huawei-went-
small-time-trader-shenzhen-worlds-biggest-telecoms [https://perma.cc/9HJT-RRAM].
313. US-China Trade War Risks Global Technology Split, FIN. TIMES (June 12,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/0e6c322e-8c4e-11e9-a1c1-51bf8f989972 [https://perma.cc/ 
B3QD-7HE8].
314. See Danny Crichton, China Splits the Internet While the U.S. Dithers, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 24, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/24/china-splits-the-internet-
while-the-u-s-dithers/ [https://perma.cc/NY5S-6U7Z].
315. Anna Isaac, Exclusive: Nokia and Ericsson Plan Emergency Break-Up over 
Trade War and Security Fears, TELEGRAPH (June 8, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.
telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/06/08/exclusive-nokia-andericsson-plan-emergency-break-
up-trade-war/ [https://perma.cc/YDD2-JRJR].
316. Daniel Bases, US Focus on Blocking China’s 5G Technology Misses Bigger














      
  
 
   
 
    





   




    




led by America.”317  China could “start developing its own protocols,
its own standards for domain name creation and transfer, its own entry 
points and distribution systems, and most importantly, its own rules and 
regulations[,]” which would then be adopted by nations running on a 
Chinese infrastructure.318  If the United States denies U.S. tech companies
access to China, AI will be developing off two different sets of data—one 
that the United States can access and the other that only China can 
access—resulting in algorithms that will not work across markets.319 
“According to a McKinsey Global Institute study, [countries] that promote 
open data sources and data sharing are the ones most likely to see AI
advances.”320  The trade war is increasing the risk that technological 
developments will not be interoperable based on the bifurcation of U.S. 
and Chinese systems.321 
As a result of the current U.S. administration’s policy of isolating 
China, “[t]he world may well be headed towards a system where most
commercially significant countries are pressed to align with one or another of
these giants.”322  The trade war has already resulted in Chinese companies 
developing their own operating systems and semiconductors for their 
telecommunication devices.323 Not only does this provide Chinese companies
317. David Silverberg, How China-US Rivalry Is Dividing the Internet, BBC NEWS
(Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50570838 [https://perma.cc/5HLZ-
D9A7].  It is unlikely that the United States will be the winner if the rest of the world is forced
to choose. In April 2019, the United States pressed its European and Latin American allies
to sign a letter of condemnation regarding the Chinese BRI, but according to a European 
diplomat present at the meeting, “[n]o one was willing to go along with it.”  Noah Barkin,
The U.S. Is Losing Europe in Its Battle with China, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2019), https://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/
590887/ [https://perma.cc/T8SM-JWKF].
318. Anna Johansson, The Internet Is Due for a Split. Here’s What You Need to Know, 
NEXT WEB (Oct. 4, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2018/10/04/the-internet-
is-due-for-a-split-heres-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/9RQV-R4W4]. 
319. Wesley Rahn, Is Google Selling Out for Access to China’s Massive Tech Market?,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/is-google-selling-out-for-access- 
to-chinas-massive-tech-market/a-45961894 [https://perma.cc/WDU7-LEK6].
320. West & Allen, supra note 33.
321. Although China keeps a tight rein on cross border transfers, countries that side
with China may also limit U.S. access to data.  See Alan Beattie, Data Protectionism: The 
Growing Menace to Global Business, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
6f0f41e4-47de-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb [https://perma.cc/SRB6-TMT2]. 
322. Craig VanGrasstek, The Trade Policy of the United States Under the Trump
Administration 18 (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies Global 
Governance Programme, Working Paper No. RSCAS 2019/11, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3330577 [https://perma.cc/T66A-YWDG].
323. See, e.g., Jon Porter, Huawei’s New Operating System Is Called HarmonyOS,
VERGE (Aug. 9, 2019, 3:24 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/9/20798251/huawei-
harmonyos-hongmengos-smartphones-internet-of-things-operating-system-android 
[https://perma.cc/A7Q9-CJNY]. Huawei recently announced the creation of its own 
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the ability to withstand a protracted trade war longer than the United
States would be able to, it also gives China additional products to market 
worldwide. On the other hand, U.S. tech companies are reeling from the
trade war. It is estimated that export controls put in place by the Trump
Administration could cause a loss of $14 to $56 billion in sales and 18,000
to 74,000 jobs over the next five years in the United States.324  Collaboration 
among academics is already decreasing.325  While the more technologically 
advanced nations will have a choice, underdeveloped countries will most 
likely align with the Chinese.326 
The United States’ desire to isolate China will also impact the setting 
of global standards for 5G technology.  This will have the most serious effect
on the United States itself because, although it was a leader in 4G technology, 
it will have no influence in 5G standards due to the lack of industry there 
specializing in 5G network equipment.327 Because Huawei has the most 
operating system, HarmonyOS, to replace its reliance on U.S.-originated Android. Id.
Huawei is also working on AI chipsets named Ascend 910.  Jack Gold, Huawei’s Big Move
from Component Maker to AI Service Provider, VENTURE BEAT (Aug. 24, 2019, 10:25
AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/08/24/huaweis-big-move-from-component-maker-to-
ai-service-provider/ [https://perma.cc/5N95-34GR].  This represents a move from being a 
component provider to that of a full-service supplier of AI technology.  Id. 
324. Robert D. Atkinson, Why Limiting U.S. Tech Exports to Chinese Companies
Like Huawei Is a Risky Strategy, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (May 23, 2019),
https://itif.org/publications/2019/05/23/why-limiting-us-tech-exports-chinese-companies-
huawei-risky-strategy [https://perma.cc/GX8D-69ZA].
325. See Sarah O’Meara, AI Researchers in China Want to Keep the Global-Sharing
Culture Alive, NATURE (May 29, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01681-x 
[https://perma.cc/Y6HX-HVZW].
326. See Thompson & Bremmer, supra note 147.
The world’s nations can commit to American technology: buying Apple phones, 
using Google search, driving Teslas, and managing a fleet of personal robots 
made by a startup in Seattle.  Or they can commit to China: using the equivalents 
built by Alibaba and Tencent, connecting through the 5G network constructed 
by Huawei and ZTE, and driving autonomous cars built by Baidu.  The choice
is a fraught one.  If you are a poor country that lacks the capacity to build your
own data network, you’re going to feel loyalty to whoever helps lay the pipes at
low cost.  It will all seem uncomfortably close to the arms and security pacts that 
defined the Cold War.
Id.
327. See Klint Finley, Does It Matter if China Beats the US to Build a 5G Network?,
WIRED (June 6, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/does-it-matter-if-china-
beats-the-us-to-build-a-5g-network/ [https://perma.cc/SCQ7-PHGX]. 
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patents for 5G technology,328 it is seeking to be the leader in developing 
standards.329  China’s White Paper on AI Standardization indicates that 
China considers AI standards to be the key to “seizing a new round of 
technological dominance.”330 
C. Need for Coordinated Development, Cooperation, and Standards
As indicated above, advancements in AI in the United States have been
funded and guided primarily by private industry advancing commercial 
pursuits.331  Recently, academics and NGOs have begun forming initiatives 
to support the responsible development of AI.332  Because the United States 
has reduced government support for technological innovation,333 it is
falling behind in being able to influence 5G and AI standards in international 
organizations.334  The proposed 2020 budget contained reductions in almost 
every category of R&D, including an 11% reduction in the budget for 
328. Katharina Buchholz, Huawei Is Leading the 5G Patent Race, STATISTA (Feb.
25, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/20095/companies-with-most-5g-patent-families-
and-patent-families-applications/ [https://perma.cc/76DK-NUU4].
329. Kaveh Waddell, The Global Race Between China and U.S. to Set the Rules for 
AI, AXIOS (July 14, 2019), https://www.axios.com/artificial-intelligence-china-united-
states-5bea5020-c5c6-4527-8d25-7bf0036f6384.html [https://perma.cc/WKD3-W2RL].
330. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Ding & Paul Triolo, Translation: Excerpts from China’s
‘White Paper on Artificial Intelligence Standardization’, NEW AM. (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-excerpts-chinas-
white-paper-artificial-intelligence-standardization/ [https://perma.cc/KHT9- KM69]).  If the
United States is unable to contribute to the telecommunication’s global standards body, 
the 3GPP Board, it will have no influence over the standards set, greatly reducing the 
marketability of U.S. originated 5G tech.  Louise Lucas, Standards Body Warns on 
US Blacklisting of Huawei, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/
7e510cc0-88ea-11e9-97ea-05ac2431f453 [https://perma.cc/Z5LK-QKCB].
331. See Will Knight, Here’s How the US Needs to Prepare for the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610379/ 
heres-how-the-us-needs-to-prepare-for-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/
D57H-H6F9].
332. See, e.g., Amy Adams, Stanford University Launches the Institute for Human-
Centered Artificial Intelligence, STAN. NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/2019/
03/18/stanford_university_launches_human-centered_ai/ [https://perma.cc/S9Y7-AD3J];
Mia Dand, 12 Organizations Saving Humanity from the Dark Side of AI, MEDIUM (Sept.
27, 2018), https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/12-organizations-saving-humanity-from-
the-dark-side-of-ai-bce8c9da1ea5 [https://perma.cc/2Q69-LQYG]. These include the Future 
of Life Institute at Oxford, the Stanford Institute for Human Centered AI, and the IEEE’s 
Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligence Systems. See Adams, supra; 
Dand; supra. 
333. Isaacson, supra note 301. A 2017 Atlantic Council “report noted, ‘federal R&D
spending has shrunk significantly over the last few decades; once the world leader, the United 
States now ranks twelfth in government-funded R&D spending as a percentage of GDP.’”  
Id.
334. See supra notes 327–30 and accompanying text.
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the National Science Foundation’s funding of research.335  The rationale
is that “there is no need for an AI moonshot, and that minimizing government 
interference is the best way to make sure the technology flourishes.”336 
As China expands its global influence, the United States is retreating due 
to the trade war and misaligned policies. 
A widespread 5G infrastructure is necessary for AI implementation in 
various fields, such as smart cities, self-driving cars, smart factories, and
medical equipment.337  Due to the diminution of U.S. dominance in the 
telecommunications industry, the United States is no longer able to drive 
standards allowing for software and hardware interchangeability.338  As a
result, standards will be set by companies and governments in the EU and 
China.339  Previous generations of telecommunications companies faced 
this problem when the United States failed to adopt standards after the 
deregulation of the telecommunications industry in 1996.340  Although the
EU adopted the GSM mobile network standard in 1987 and China in 1997, 
the United States permitted individual carriers to determine their own standard 
resulting in carriers with noninterchangeable systems.341 As a consequence, 
335. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 268 (2019), https:// 
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2020-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2020-PER.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4BLJ-4DB9]. 
336. Knight, supra note 331.
337. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
338. Soo, supra note 260.
339. See Finley, supra note 327.  In 2018, two of the top four 5G networking equipment 
companies were in China and the other two in the EU.  Stefan Pongratz, Key Takeaways 
– Worldwide Telecom Equipment Market 2018, DELL’ORO GROUP (Mar. 4, 2019), https://
www.delloro.com/telecom-equipment-market-2018-2/ [https://perma.cc/L479-V74G]; see also
Gisela Grieger, European Parliamentary Research Serv., 5G in the EU and Chinese Telecoms 
Suppliers, at 1, PE 637.912 (Apr. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg Data/etudes/ 
ATAG/2019/637912/EPRS_ATA(2019)637912_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/U89G-R2Q8].
340. See Soo, supra note 260.
341. Id.; see also Brief History of GSM & the GSMA, GSMA, https://www.gsma.
com/aboutus/history [https://perma.cc/8JKP-9BUR].  The CDMA (Code Division Multiple
Access) mobile standard developed by Qualcomm was adopted by Verizon and Sprint while 
the GSM standard was chosen by AT&T and T-Mobile and TDMA (Time Division
Multiple Access) and AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone Systems) by others still.  Soo, supra 
note 260; see generally Arun A. Bhatjl, TDMA and CDMA in Mobile Communications 
(Apr. 13, 2004) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State University), https://fsu.digital. 
flvc.org/islandora/object/fsu:175931/datastream/PDF/view [https://perma.cc/VUY7-4NLA]
(describing CDMA and TDMA mobile technologies).  CDMA is one type of radio technology 
used in the United States and GSM (Global Systems for Mobiles) is the radio technology 
adopted through Europe and much of the rest of the world.  Sascha Segan, CDMA vs. GSM: 
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a device configured on one system would not work on another.342  Lucent,
for example, a former U.S. telecom communication equipment provider, 
chose CDMA and UMTS radio technology on which to build its equipment, 
neither of which were used in Europe.343  Additionally, the United States
has wagered on mmWaves for its 5G spectrum allocation as opposed 
to China and the EU, who have opted to focus on mid-range bands further 
reducing the opportunity for interchangeability of components and access 
to the market abroad.344  Although higher frequencies result in faster speed
and lower latency, they also are limited to much shorter distances and cannot 
pass through solid objects requiring a much denser base station installation 
than those that use lower frequencies.345  As a result, countries and
municipalities around the world looking to save costs on infrastructure would 
choose Chinese equipment designed for these midrange frequencies, which 
most likely can be built on or adjacent to existing towers.346  The United 
States will be forced to build an entirely new, highly dense infrastructure 
for 5G costing billions for which it has no plans to fund again relying on 
347 private industry.
Another important area that is being advanced without input from the 
United States is in cybersecurity.  Huawei has already launched a Cyber 
Security Center in Brussels that seeks to create cybersecurity standards
for telecommunications equipment.348  Huawei’s Deputy Chair, Ken Hu, 
indicated that standards need to be adopted and agreed upon because global 
supply chains consist of components from all over the world with different 
What’s the Difference?, PC MAG. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.pcmag.com/news/cdma-vs-
gsm-whats-the-difference [https://perma.cc/BTA5-3EW3].
342. See Soo, supra note 260.
343. Id.  UMTS (Universal Mobile Telephone System) is a type of CDMA radio
technology.  See Segan, supra note 341. 
344. See Kimberly A. Houser & Anjanette Raymond, It Is Time to Move Beyond the
‘AI Race’ Narrative: Why Investment and International Cooperation Must Win the Day, 
18 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33 n.191, 40, 58), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3582641 [https://perma.cc/EXB2-UU3F]. 
345. See Hongtao Zhan, 5G Will Hit a Wall, Literally, in 2019, NETWORK
COMPUTING (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.networkcomputing.com/networking/5g-will-hit-
wall-literally-2019 [https://perma.cc/YS8P-N8ET].
346. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 117, at 28–29; Hsu, supra note 251; see also
Jeremy Horwitz, The Definitive Guide to 5G Low, Mid, and High Band Speeds, VENTURE 
BEAT (Dec. 10, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/12/10/the-definitive-guide-
to-5g-low-mid-and-high-band-speeds/ [https://perma.cc/4KHR-E2MW].
347. See Hillol Roy, Tackling the Cost of a 5G Build, ACCENTURE (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/strategy/5g-network-build [https://perma.cc/
8Z7S-5PM6]. Accenture puts the potential cost at $275 billion. Id. 
348. Rob O’Neill, Huawei: EU GDPR Regulations Provide a Model for Cyber 
Security, RESELLER NEWS (Mar. 6, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.reseller.co.nz/article/658493/ 
huawei-eu-gdpr-regulations-provide-model-cyber-security/ [https://perma.cc/S49Q- 287M].
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or no standards.349  Locating the center in Brussels indicates a willingness
to work with EU authorities who are already considered to have an advanced 
understanding of the issues based on their creation of the General Data 
Protection Regulation.350  Rather than pursuing collaboration with the
United States, Huawei has announced a strategic alliance with the Moscow 
Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) in Russia.351  This newly formed 
coalition will share strategy and work together to form AI technologies.352 
What is especially concerning is the United States’ lack of cybersecurity 
innovations.353  According to two dozen national security experts, “America’s 
computers are almost completely defenseless.”354  Consequently, this failure 
puts the United States at great risk in a cyber war.355 
349. Id.
New developments in All Cloud, intelligence, and software-defined everything
are posing unprecedented challenges to the cyber security of ICT infrastructure. 
The lack of consensus on cyber security, technical standards, verification systems,
and legislative support further exacerbates these challenges.  Safeguarding cyber 
security is considered to be a responsibility held by all industry players and
society as a whole.  Growing security risks are significant threats to future digital
society.




351. Varvara Bogomolova, MIPT and HUAWEI Started Cooperation in the Field of 
Artificial Intelligence, SCIENMAG (Aug. 19, 2019), https://scienmag.com/mipt-and-huawei-
started-cooperation-in-the-field-of-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/WXE9-T726].
352. Id.  This should be an enormous concern to the United States.  By trying to
isolate China, the United States has instead created an incentive for China to partner with 
others leaving the United States completely out.  See id. 
353. See  KELLEY M. SAYLOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45178. ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 15 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.
pdf [https://perma.cc/33LU-LEGG]; see also Amy Zegart & Michael Morell, Spies, Lies 
and Algorithms: Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt of Fail, FOREIGN AFF. (May/ 
June 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/spies-lies-and-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/KF6S-UXYB] (explaining how U.S. intelligence agencies are not keeping 
up with new technology, including AI).  AI has enormous potential nonlethal uses for military 
purposes such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistics, for example.  See SAYLOR, 
supra, at 9–11. 
354. John M. Donnelly & Gopal Ratnam, America Is Woefully Unprepared for
Cyber-Warfare, ROLL CALL (July 11, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/u-
s-is-woefully-unprepared-for-cyber-warfare [https://perma.cc/33N2-AZKU]. 
355. See Anthony Capaccio, The Pentagon’s Cybersecurity Is Falling Behind,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
01-28/pentagon-s-cybersecurity-found-unable-to-stay-ahead-of-attackers [https://perma.cc/
U82U-8XBA]. Although beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how advancements in 
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The movement towards protectionism is effectively preventing the
United States from being able to influence the development and standards 
for AI as well.  The EU has already drafted a plan for the ethical development 
of AI.356  China’s prominence in 5G hardware, and its current installation 
in China and much of the EU, is permitting it to influence standards in this 
area for those who continue to adopt their technology.357 China has already 
begun working on an international set of global standards on ethical 
norms, which if adopted globally, will likely reflect Chinese culture and 
ideology rather than the West’s.358 By withdrawing from international
organizations and attempting to thwart rather than guide the responsible 
development of AI, we risk AI being created without appropriate safeguards 
for humanity.359  Without cooperation, tech companies in the United States
and China will be competing with one another making it unlikely that they 
will devote time and resources to the coordinated development of AI for 
social good.360 The U.S. withdrawal from the WTO and its multilateral 
AI relate to cybersecurity, it should be noted that even the Pentagon acknowledges that 
they are ill prepared to detect and prevent against cyberattacks by adversaries. Id.
 356. See generally Tambiama Madiega, European Parliamentary Research Serv., EU 
Guidelines on Ethics in Artificial Intelligence: Context and Implementation, PE 640.163 
(Sept. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/640163/ EPRS_
BRI(2019)640163_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH7A-FPFS]. The Chinese have a different
culture and different expectations of privacy than the United States.  While China looks 
at facial recognition deployment as a helpful technology that can identify criminals as well 
as lost children, they are also engaged in the development of ethical standards for AI, 
which will reflect their cultural norms.  Jane Zhang, Privacy Vs Social Good: AI Must 
Balance Responsibilities, China Governance Expert Says, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(Aug. 20, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3023407/old-problem-
balancing-individual-rights-social-good-just-important-ai [https://perma.cc/B5RY-MYCZ].
The United States has lost its ability to influence this ethical discussion for a variety of
reasons, not the least of which is the trade war. See, e.g., id.
357. For a list of countries who have banned or adopted Huawei as the supplier of
their 5G network, see Joe Panettieri, Huawei: Banned and Permitted in Which Countries? 
List and FAQ, CHANNELE2E (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.channele2e.com/business/enterprise/ 
huawei-banned-in-which-countries/ [https://perma.cc/HP76-JQZL].
358. See Waddell, supra note 329.  One of the concerns is that Chinese AI developed 
in the area of surveillance will be sold to authoritarian countries.  Chris C. Demchak, China: 
Determined to Dominate Cyberspace and AI, 75 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 99, 102 (2019). 
359. See Amy Webb, How Can We Design AI for the Best Long-Term Interests 
of Humanity?, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90312306/ 
how-can-we-design-ai-for-the-best-long-term-interests-of-humanity [https://perma.cc/
HK5X-SSQJ] (“The Big Nine [Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, IBM, Apple, Baidu, 
Alibaba and Tencent] should develop a process to evaluate the ethical implications of research, 
workflows, projects, partnerships, and products, and that process should be woven in to 
most of the job functions within the companies.”). 
360. Khari Johnson, Amy Webb’s ‘The Big Nine’ Predicts the Impact of AI and Tech 
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agreements, along with its institution of a trade war with China, will reduce
its influence in the world leaving a large gap, which China will be only 
too happy to fill.  China’s model of a government-controlled internet is 
already taking root in Vietnam and Thailand.361  It is already apparent 
that there is no global consensus on what ethical AI looks like.  Labeled 
AI for good, trustworthy AI, responsible AI, or AI governance, all 
acknowledge the transformative value of AI, but differ in how to address 
the risks involved. Developing standards in isolation will not work 
because of the global nature of technology today.  While a global consensus 
may be difficult to come by, it will be devastating for the United States to 
have no role in this discussion. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In recognition of their differing cultures and ideologies, one of the most
important recommendations that came out of the 2013 Sunnyland Summit 
between President Obama and President Xi was the admonition “Do not 
allow bilateral differences and suspicions [between the United States and 
China] to derail cooperation.”362 
The Joint Working Group is concerned, however, that developments in bilateral 
relations could impede the ability of the two countries to work together to meet
common global challenges, thus imperiling each country’s long-run prosperity
and security.  Consequently, it is the responsibility of the leaderships of the two 
countries to step back from the current dynamic of US-China relations and begin
an earnest search for a balance of interests that could underpin a long-term
relationship that is largely cooperative.363 
This prophetic statement acknowledges the need for international 
cooperation.  The report goes on to warn of the danger of becoming
“strategic . . . enemies” resulting in “devot[ing] increasing resources to
unnecessary and counter-productive geopolitical and military competition.”364 
The report seems to predict that the failure of these two powers to work 
together will result in what we are seeing today: the trade war, currency
destabilization, market uncertainty, and the potential for a cyber war, if 
361.  Lulu Yilun Chen & Yoolim Lee, The U.S. Is Losing a Major Front to China in 
the New Cold War, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2019-04-14/china-wins-allies-for-web-vision-in-ideological-battle-with- 
u-s [https://perma.cc/BPB9-4BPP].















         
  
 
not an actual war.365  The United States is wholly unprepared to deal with 
war in cyberspace due to the lack of appropriate cybersecurity protections 
and investment in technology. No border wall will be a defense against a 
cyber war.366  The United States is playing a game of catch-up, but rather
than supporting its own tech industry it is seeking to slow down China’s 
progress. The United States cannot afford to miss out on AI’s potential to 
deliver $13 trillion to the global economy.367 The U.S.-instigated trade 
war not only threatens the global economy and endangers democracy, it 
will likely cause an innovation winter—hindering future developments in 
AI. There is a very real danger that should the United States and China 
continue with this decoupling, the result could be a bifurcated internet, the 
development of technology on two divergent tracks, and a 5G infrastructure 
with non-interchangeable components requiring the rest of the world 
to choose a side. Although the damage from the trade war is likely to 
be long-term, if the United States does not learn how to exist in a world 
with a new balance of power, it will suffer the most from the coming 
Innovation Winter. 
365. See Erik Gartzke & Yonatan Lupu, Trading on Preconceptions: Why World 
War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2012, at 
115, 117–18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428122 [https://perma.cc/27NS-35D2] (“The 
notion that international trade is associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict has
found significant empirical support.”)
366. The Pentagon is diverting $3.6 billion to fund the border wall desired by President
Trump.  Zachary Cohen & Ryan Browne, Lawmakers Furious After Learning How Military 
Will Pay for Trump’s Wall, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 4, 2019, 7:29 PM), https://www.cnn.
com/2019/09/04/politics/lawmakers-pentagon-border-wall/index.html [https://perma.cc/
D87X-6L5L]. 
367. See Bughin et al., supra note 29. 
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